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Abstract 
We report the results from a representative survey of human resource managers 
in 885 Swedish firms. We estimate that during the severe recession of the 
1990s, only 1.1 percent of workers took a cut in regular nominal pay. We trace 
the lack of wage moderation to a combination of exogenous (primarily labor 
law and collective bargaining contracts) and endogenous factors. Our analysis 
suggests that (i) endogenous wage rigidity plays an important role in most 
segments of the labor market, (ii) sources of endogenous wage rigidity differ 
significantly between the high- and low-end of the labor market, and between 
large and small firms, and (iii) mechanisms of wage rigidity tend to comple-
ment each other. Some of our questions deal with issues in the economics of 
personnel. We report evidence that job protection tends to reinforce the stigma 
from long-term unemployment, and that labor market training tends to reduce 
the same stigma. We show that managers in small organizations have a more 
negative attitude towards incentive schemes based on relative rewards, and we 
report evidence suggesting that gender have an impact on attitudes concerning 
effort and motivation. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years some economists have used surveys of those who bargain over 
wages to understand the mechanisms of wage rigidity, see Table 1. Though this 
research has provided many useful insights, it falls short of the ideals proposed 
in sampling texts. Some studies cover very few firms; see Kaufman (1984) and 
Blinder and Choi (1990). Others focus on firms situated in narrowly defined 
business sectors, see Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002). No study provides a 
representative coverage of small firms. Some authors obtain their samples 
through “snowballing”, which implies that original respondents were asked for 
additional persons to interview; cf. the impressive study of Bewley (1995, 
1999). Finally, due to low response rates, non-response bias is a potentially se-
rious issue.  
We improve on the statistical methodology of previous survey research. Our 
randomized sampling design allows us to make comparisons between segments 
of the labor market of particular interest for students of work and pay. Our 
sample was drawn to provide a balanced coverage of enterprise units in four 
sectors (manufacturing, unskilled services, skilled services, and public admini-
stration), and in three size categories. We took many steps to reduce non-
response bias, and we obtained replies from 885 enterprise units, implying a 
very high response rate of 75.1 percent. Unlike previous studies we have a 
large sample of small firms, consisting of 300 firms with less than 20 employ-
ees.
1 Moreover, Statistics Sweden provided us with extensive background in-
formation about responding units, and about their workforce.  
                                                       
1 The mean number of employees for the 19 firms interviewed by Blinder and Choi (1990) was 
5,767. The mean firm size in Agell and Lundborg (1995) was 1,154 employees, and only a hand-
ful of their firms had less than 100 employees. Nine of the 235 businesses interviewed by Bew-
ley (1999) had less than ten employees. The sub-sample of 73 smaller firms surveyed by Camp-
bell and Kamlani (1997) refers to firms with less than 1,000 employees that were situated in a 
certain geographical area, and had a connection to the authors or to Colgate University. Kaufman 
(1984) focuses on small firms, but his 26 firms were not drawn at random, and they were concen-
trated to certain geographical areas. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   6
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Finally, our survey was implemented in a macroeconomic environment ide-
ally tailored to the needs of students of wage rigidity.
2 Throughout the postwar 
period, until 1990, Swedish unemployment never exceeded 4 percent. Between 
1991 and 1993, however, GDP fell by more than five percent, and total unem-
ployment (including those enrolled in labor market programs) increased from 
almost 4 percent to almost 13 percent of the work force. Between 1990 and 
1994 the total number of employees decreased by 14 percent, and the rate of 
job destruction was high in all sectors.
3 By the time we sent out our survey in 
early 1999 more than 10 percent of the workforce was still either unemployed, 
or enrolled in a labor market program. The sharp increase in unemployment 
brought about a rapid end to Swedish inflation. Inflation decelerated from 
above 10 percent in 1991, down to 2.4 percent in 1994. In the five-year period 
preceding our survey (1993–98) average inflation was about 1 percent, with lit-
tle variation between years. 
Below we report calculations suggesting that during this 5–6 year period of 
labor market slack and very low inflation only between 0.5 and 1.7 percent of 
workers took a cut in regular nominal pay. These calculations seem to support 
the view of those macroeconomists who argue that wage rigidity is an impor-
tant phenomenon, and that adjustments to adverse macroeconomic shocks may 
take a long time, perhaps up to a decade.  
No doubt, the pervasive nature of wage rigidity can be partly attributed to 
country-specific regulations and bargaining institutions. The wage cuts that did 
occur took place in firms that were lowly unionized. The incidence of wage 
cuts was significantly higher in the skilled service sector, where collective bar-
gaining agreements play a lesser role. We report evidence that unemployment 
benefits contribute to wage rigidity in the low-end of the labor market. Many 
managers indicate that Swedish employment protection creates important costs 
of hirings and firings, a result that vindicates a key assumption in Holden’s 
(1994, 2002) analysis of nominal wage rigidity. In his model strict employment 
                                                       
2 Except for Agell and Lundborg (2002) recent survey studies of wage rigidity have been con-
ducted in periods when the activity level has fluctuated within normal intervals. Though Bewley 
(1999) began his interviewing towards the end of the US recession of the early 1990s, the depth 
and length of this recession is not at all comparable to the Swedish macroeconomic bust of the 
1990s. 
3 According to the Labour Force Surveys of Statistics Sweden, the number of employees in 
manufacturing decreased by 24 percent between 1991 and 1994. In public administration the de-
crease was 19 percent between 1991 and 1995. In what we refer to as unskilled services (hotel 
and restaurants) employment fell by 16 percent between 1991 and 1993. For a broad discussion 
of the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s, see Lindbeck (1997). IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   8
protection prevents firms from dismissing workers who refuse to take a wage 
cut, and it is this legal feature that gives workers the strength to prevent the 
firm from implementing unilateral wage cuts.  
Yet, much of our survey was specifically designed to explore the nature and 
sources of endogenous wage rigidity, i.e. rigidities that reflect general behav-
ioral mechanisms unrelated to legal and bargaining institutions. We find sub-
stantial support for explanations linking work performance and voluntary turn-
over to wages, and we show evidence that a feeling of underpayment leads to a 
reciprocal effort response. Many managers indicate that their employees are 
subject to money illusion, and that workers care about relative wages. These re-
sults corroborate the findings of the studies of Table 1, based on much less rep-
resentative samples. These results also corroborate recent experimental work, 
which has demonstrated that reciprocity and gift exchange play an important 
role in generating wage rigidity in experimental labor markets; see Gächter and 
Fehr (2001) for a survey.
4  
But we also document several novel results. First, our econometric analysis 
shows that the strength of the mechanisms of endogenous rigidity differs sig-
nificantly between segments of the labor market. We report robust evidence 
that efficiency wage mechanisms involving work morale play a more important 
role in larger organizations. Managers in larger organizations are more prone to 
indicate (i) that they have imperfect information about effort, (ii) that higher 
external wages reduce effort and (iii) that employees who feel underpaid recip-
rocate by reducing effort. We present results showing that the size-effect in-
volving (ii) and (iii) is not due to insufficient monitoring capacity of larger or-
ganizations. The voluntary turnover mechanism is most important for the high-
end of the labor market, where workers are highly paid and highly educated. It 
also appears that this particular mechanism is of greater concern for managers 
in regions with a large local labor market. Though most managers rejected the 
implication from the shirking model that higher benefits have a negative impact 
on work performance, this mechanism may play a role for the low-end of the 
labor market.  
Second, the mechanisms of wage rigidity appear to complement each other. 
Worker-firm bargaining over wages (which may occur in union as well as non-
union settings) and efficiency wage mechanisms are important independent 
                                                       
4 Agell (1999) makes the point that the best way of acquiring empirical knowledge about the 
sources of wage rigidity is by combining the insights from the survey literature and the experi-
mental literature.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  9 
causes of wage rigidity. Below, we report evidence that these mechanisms in-
teract: firms in which rent sharing play an important role are also firms where 
efficiency wage mechanisms appear to play a relatively important role. Simi-
larly, unions and workers’ concern about relative pay are often treated as inde-
pendent causes of wage rigidity. Our analysis suggests, however, that workers’ 
interest in external pay is robustly correlated with union density, and we con-
clude that relative wage theories of wage rigidity – following Keynes (1936, p. 
14) – holds most promise for unionized sectors of the economy. As noted by 
Summers (1988) these kinds of interactions between mechanisms (seldom ac-
counted for in theoretical models of wage rigidity) may magnify greatly the ex-
tent of wage rigidity.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews our sample design. 
Section 3 briefly reviews institutional aspects of Swedish wage bargaining, and 
explains our statistical analysis. Section 4 presents our results on the incidence 
of nominal wage cuts. Section 5 contains our analysis of the mechanisms of 
wage rigidity, and presents our evidence on the complementary nature of 
mechanisms of wage rigidity.  
The ensuing sections examine some issues in the economics of personnel. 
Section 6 reports evidence on the stigma from long-term unemployment, and 
on how the stigma correlates with strict job protection. An important novel 
finding is that we find evidence that job protection makes it more difficult for 
the long-term unemployed to re-enter the labor market. We also report evi-
dence that labor market training appears to reduce the bias against the long-
term unemployed. Section 7 shows that larger organizations rely on pecuniary 
incentive schemes to a significantly greater extent than smaller ones, and that 
there appears to be a complementary relation between firms’ use of pecuniary 
reward schemes and “soft” incentives that try to promote good management-
worker relations. Managers in smaller organizations have a significantly more 
negative attitude towards incentive schemes based on relative rewards. Finally, 
section 8 presents some preliminary evidence on how gender impacts on incen-
tives, bargaining and work moral.  
 IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   10
2  Sample and survey design 
2.1 Sampling  design 
Our sampling frame is the Business Register
5 of Statistics Sweden, a register 
that includes the addresses to all enterprises that carry out (legal) activity in 
Sweden. It covers all forms of businesses, including limited liability compa-
nies, partnerships, associations, branch offices of foreign enterprises, etc. It 
covers businesses in all size classes, ranging from one-man firms to multina-
tionals, and it includes addresses to all government bodies. For each unit there 
is continually updated information about the number of employees, sectoral af-
filiation at a very detailed level (the Swedish SIC code has five hierarchical 
classification levels), and geographical location. In 1999 the register contained 
the addresses to almost 800,000 independent firms (employing 4.1 million peo-
ple), and to the 877,768 geographically separated local units where they con-
ducted their activities.  
As we wanted to explore wage-setting mechanisms at the level of the indi-
vidual plant, and as officials at the head office of a large company might know 
less about pay at the local level, we chose the local unit as our sampling unit. 
Another consideration was what sectors to focus on. As we wanted to cast light 
on mechanisms discussed in the academic literature, we did not aim at a bal-
anced coverage of all sectors. We rather wanted to include those sectors that 
provided sufficient variation to shed light on the theoretical arguments. For this 
reason, we included four sectors in our sampling frame: manufacturing, skilled 
services, unskilled services, and public sector administration (precise defini-
tions, and SIC codes, are shown in the notes to Table 2).  
We included the manufacturing sector in its entirety, since it has been at the 
center of attraction in previous field-research, and since it serves as a natural 
benchmark for our analysis. Skilled services (which comprises computer con-
sulting, law firms, R&D institutes, and architect’s offices) is of interest because 
it represents a segment of the labor market with complicated jobs and relatively 
high wages. It is also a sector where models of work-life incentives and tour-
naments might be of particular relevance. Unskilled services (which consists of 
restaurants and hotels) is of interest for the opposite reason. Because unskilled 
                                                       
5 The Business Register is primarily based on information collected for administrative purposes. 
A main source of information is The National Patent and Registration Office, which maintains 
regularly updated addresses to all business units that operate in Sweden. Detailed information 
about the Business Register can be obtained from the web site of Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  11
services represent a sector with simple jobs, that might be easy to monitor, one 
may suspect that the wage setting mechanisms look rather different, and that 
the forces of demand and supply play a more important role. Finally, it also 
seems worthwhile to pay attention to differences between wage setting in en-
terprises that operate under profit maximizing conditions and those that operate 
under other sets of constraints. For this reason we included public sector ad-
ministration. After these exclusions we were left with 74,335 units, employing 
1.23 million people (which is 30 percent of total employment).  
An important consideration in deciding the sampling frame was how to deal 
with the smallest units, with less than five employees. Since their workforce of-
ten consists of relatives of the owner, standard models of wage determination 
need not apply. Moreover, based on their own experience, Statistics Sweden 
cautioned us that not even a substantial investment of our scarce research 
money would buy a satisfactory response rate for these units. We therefore de-
cided to exclude all units with less than five employees. After these exclusions, 
we were left with 29,782 local units, divided among four sectors, and employ-
ing 1.141 million people. We divided these remaining units in three size cate-
gories, small ones with 5–19 employees, medium sized ones with 20–99 em-
ployees, and larger ones with more than 99 employees. The resulting twelve 
strata are shown in Table 2.  
Cost considerations limited our total sample to 1,200 local units. It is com-
mon to make sample size proportional to the total number of units in each stra-
tum. In our case, however, a strict application of this principle implies that a 
very large share of the sample ought to be allocated to the units with less than 
20 employees. But we would then face an obvious risk of getting less reliable 
responses from the largest units that may employ several thousand employees. 
In manufacturing, for example, there is a total of 14,027 units, of which no less 
than 8,745 (62.3 percent) belong in the smallest size category. At the same 
time, these units represent only 12.2 percent of total employment in this sector. 
To strike a balance, we in the end assigned a random sample of 100 to each 
stratum (our net samples deviate somewhat from this simple allocation because 
some units ceased operation between the time our sample was drawn and our 
questionnaire sent out). Since the total population of unskilled service units in 
the largest size category consisted of only 50 units, we reallocated 50 random 
drawings to the stratum consisting of small, manufacturing units. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   12
Table 2. Population, sample, and response rates 
Strata Total  no.  of 





Gross sample Net sample,





Manufacturing, 5–19 employees  8,745 82,962 150 149 110 73.8
Manufacturing, 20–99 employees  3,998 171,330 100   98   77 78.6
Manufacturing, 100– employees  1,284 426,451 100   99   83 83.8
Unskilled services, 5–19  employees  3,090 27,481 100   98   45 45.9
Unskilled services, 20–99 employees            894 33,959 100 100   63 63.0
Unskilled services, 100– employees                 50 8,154   50   49   32 65.3
Skilled services, 5–19 employees  5,906 52,552 100   99   69 69.7
Skilled services, 20–99 employees  1,606 60,851 100   98   74 75.5
Skilled services, 100– employees              232 60,600 100   97   76 78.4
Public administration, 5–19 employees  1,699 18,942 100   96   76 79.2
Public administration, 20–99 employees  1,762 74,960 100   99   88 88.8
Public administration, 100– employees              517 123,132 100   97   92 94.8
Total 29,782 1,141,374 1,200 1,179 885 75.1
Notes: Manufacturing includes the manufacturing sector in its entirety; unskilled services include hotel and restaurant units; skilled services in-
clude computer consultants, R&D units, law firms, etc.; public administration includes civilian authorities, and a smaller number of defense units. 
All units have a SIC code according to NACE, the industrial classification system of the European Union. According to this system, manufacturing 
is group D, unskilled services group H, and Public Administration group L. Skilled services include subgroups K72, K73, and part of K74.IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  13
Our questionnaire was sent out in March 1999. After three written remind-
ers, where the second one contained another copy of the questionnaire, the data 
gathering was called off in May. In all, we obtained 885 useable replies, which 
implies a response rate of 75.1 percent, much above the ones reported in Table 
1. As can be seen in Table 2, public sector units have the highest response rate, 
and unskilled service units the lowest. Also, the response rate is higher among 
large units. Appendix 1 below reports an analysis of the potential non-response 
bias in our survey. Under the assumption that non-responders would have an-
swered in exactly the same way as the late responders, who replied only after 
one or more reminders, we can predict the potential magnitude of the non-
response bias. Based on this standard method of analyzing non-response bias, 
we conclude that the potential bias is quite small. This reflects two circum-
stances. First, the responses of late responders do not differ much from those of 
the immediate responders. Second, the percentage of non-response (24.9%) in 
our survey is in fact quite low. 
 
2.2 Our  questionnaire 
Appendix 2 contains an English translation of our questionnaire. All questions 
are closed ones, and we asked respondents to indicate their replies on an ordi-
nal scale, with four or five options (the surveys of Agell and Lundborg (1995, 
2002), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Levine (1993) follow the same pat-
tern). The reason for this is that we wanted to quantify all answers, and that we 
judged electronic scoring to be the most reliable way of handling the completed 
questionnaires. A letter explaining the purpose of our survey accompanied the 
questionnaire. We promised that respondents’ anonymity would be preserved, 
and we asked for the cooperation from the human resource manager, or “some-
one with corresponding experience of personnel policy and pay bargaining”. 
Some previous field research (e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990) and Campbell 
and Kamlani (1997)) asked respondents to react to a selection of theories of 
wage rigidity. Though a small number of our questions proceed in this manner, 
most of them concern concrete issues of work and pay. We emphasized that we 
were interested in understanding practices at the respondent’s own unit, and we 
tried – like Bewley (1999) – to avoid hypothetical questions, or questions that 
required respondents to assess the general equilibrium implications of firm-
level wage setting. 
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2.3  Matched worker-firm data 
We obtained most of our background information from Statistics Sweden. The 
Business Register contains information about the unit, when it began operation, 
its legal form, detailed sectoral classification, number of employees, etc. Our 
main source of information about employees is the employment register of Sta-
tistics Sweden, which includes the population of registered residents in Sweden. 
This register contains detailed demographic and educational data, and it has 
been augmented with information about taxable earnings and asset income, and 
about incomes from social insurance. Since the employment register contains 
information about the unit where people make their living, we could create a 
link between those units that filled out our questionnaire and their employees. 
Thus, for all but a handful of units we have detailed economic and demo-
graphic information about their employees. 
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics; there is clearly a lot of variation 
in our background data. Workers in manufacturing are predominantly male, 
lowly educated, and heavily unionized. Workers in unskilled services are pre-
dominantly female, young, lowly unionized, and often born in a non-Nordic 
country. They are also lowly educated, lowly paid and less prone to hold a 
permanent job contract. Workers in skilled services are highly educated, highly 
paid, lowly unionized and often covered by a scheme of profit sharing. Work-
ers in public administration are heavily unionized, relatively old and highly 
educated, and nearly always born in a Nordic country. 
 
 
3 Some  preliminaries 
3.1 Swedish  institutions 
Most Swedish employees have their pay determined in a two-stage process, 
where bargaining at the level of the firm follows bargaining between unions 
and employers’ organizations at the level of the industry. Until the mid-1980s 
the local component played a lesser role, except for white-collar workers in the 
private sector. However, during the 1990s wage setting has become much more 
responsive to local conditions, and to the characteristics of individual employ-
ees. It is important to note that this move towards decentralization applies IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  15
Table 3. Some background characteristics of final sample 
Strata 
(Industry and  








































Manufacturing, 5–19 employees  0.58 0.23 0.06 39.4  0.33 0.14 183,964 0.28 0.87
Manufacturing, 20–99 empl.  0.82 0.25 0.07 40.0  0.35 0.12 192,138 0.39 0.90
Manufacturing, 100– empl.   0.88 0.30 0.07 40.0  0.29 0.20 208,718 0.35 0.92
Unskilled services, 5–19 empl.  0.60 0.60 0.19 32.0  0.33 0.16   90,945 0.13 0.70
Unskilled services, 20–99 empl.  0.44 0.62 0.13 28.9  0.32 0.13   96,634 0.12 0.66
Unskilled services, 100– empl.  0.60 0.60 0.23 32.6  0.27 0.16 135,042 0.32 0.72
Skilled services, 5–19 empl.  0.49 0.37 0.03 38.9  0.12 0.44 233,314 0.36 0.90
Skilled services, 20–99 empl.  0.50 0.34 0.05 38.0  0.09 0.58 267,286 0.39 0.87
Skilled services, 100– empl.  0.63 0.36 0.07 40.2  0.07 0.65 279,806 0.34 0.88
Public administration, 5–19 empl.  0.94 0.50 0.03 44.1  0.13 0.39 170,980 0.00 0.85
Public administration, 20–99 empl  0.93 0.54 0.03 45.5  0.13 0.44 197,917 0.00 0.88
Public administration, 100– empl.  0.91 0.48 0.03 44.5  0.11 0.54 227,389 0.01 0.89
Notes: The information about union density, the share of employees covered by profit sharing and the share of employees on a permanent employ-
ment contract were provided by the respondents, and indicated on an interval scale. The fractions shown in the relevant columns are the midpoints of 
the interval reported by the average respondent in each stratum. The information in the other columns comes from the matched worker-firm data set, 
compiled by Statistics Sweden. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   16
also for blue-collar workers.
6  
The Swedish Metalworkers’ Union, which organizes more than 400,000 
blue-collar workers, is a case in point. This central union signs an industry-
level wage agreement that regulates the minimum average rate of wage in-
crease at workplaces in the engineering sector. At the same time, the Metal-
workers’ Union delegates the determination of the pay of individual workers to 
bargaining at the workplace. As a consequence individual workers may in the 
end receive wage hikes that are considerably lower or higher than the rate of 
wage increase agreed upon at the industry-level. It is also of interest to note 
that the industry-level wage contract contains recommendations that the skills 
and competence of individual workers should be decisive factors in the local 
pay bargain.  
Our survey is specifically designed to cast light on pay determination at the 
local level, i.e. bargaining involving the firm and the local union, and the firm 
and individual employees. Our survey sheds no light on incentives facing wage 
setters at the level of the industry, and it provides no information about aggre-
gate bargaining interactions.  
Though pay setting has become considerably more decentralized, it is im-
portant to note that Swedish labor law disallows employers the right to cut 
nominal pay unilaterally. This is so also in a situation when the old wage con-
tract has expired. The old wage is treated as a part of the employment contract, 
which can only be modified by mutual consent. The inability of firms to reduce 
wages unilaterally derives from the Swedish Employment Security Act, LAS, 
which prevents firms’ from dismissing employees unless there is just cause.
7 
Without this stipulation an employer would be unhindered simply to terminate 
the employment contract of employees who refuse to accept a wage cut.  
In assessing the scope for nominal wage cuts it should also be noted that the 
industry-level wage contracts for blue-collar workers normally prevent the par-
ties at the local level from striking deals that produce an average rate of wage 
                                                       
6 For an overview of the Swedish system of wage bargaining, see Nilsson (1992).  
7 Swedish labor law allows the firm to give its employees notice of quit if there is a “scarcity of 
work”. This possibility strengthens a firm’s bargaining position vis-à-vis its employees: if em-
ployees can be convinced that their jobs will be lost unless wage costs are reduced, they might 
accept to cut pay. In assessing the incentive to use the threat of redundancies to reap wage con-
cessions, one must note that Swedish job protection legislation implies that layoffs must follow a 
strict seniority principle. A firm that declares a redundancy has no guarantee that it can keep its 
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growth below the minimum rate agreed upon at the industry-level. Unless the 
parties at the industry-level have reached an agreement to cut pay it is therefore 
very difficult for the parties at the local level to implement a legally binding 
deal to lower average wage costs.
8 For white-collar workers the industry-level 
agreements are normally more open-ended, and the parties at the local level of-
ten have the option to strike alternative deals. It is also important to note that 
union density is significantly lower among white-collar workers, and that there 
are segments (think of the new economy) of the labor market where two-tier 
bargaining plays little role.  
Though many countries have laws that prevent unilateral wage cuts, and 
though two-tier bargaining is widespread in Europe, there is scant theoretical 
work on the macroeconomic consequences. An exception is Holden (1994, 
2002), who shows that the requirement that firms must not unilaterally cut pay 
after an old contract has expired alters the threat points in the worker-firm bar-
gain. He shows that this “after-effect” of the old contract may generate substan-
tial nominal rigidity. Holden (1998) analyzes two-tier bargaining, and he shows 
that the existence of a nominal wage floor at the industry-level implies that real 
wages become more rigid as inflation is reduced.  
 
3.2  Theories of endogenous wage rigidity 
A large literature has emphasized that wage rigidity might occur for intrinsic 
microeconomic and bargaining reasons, unrelated to unions and labor law. 
Representative approaches are e.g.: 
(i).  The insider-outsider approaches of e.g. Gottfries and Horn (1986) 
and Lindbeck and Snower (1988), in which the rent sharing of in-
cumbent workers raises wages above the competitive wage level.  
(ii).  The efficiency wage approach, which predicts that firms for a vari-
ety of reasons (related to shirking, labor turnover, reciprocity, etc.) 
have an interest in raising wages above the level consistent with 
                                                       
8 To the extent that both local employer and local union have a shared interest in cut-
ting pay, they can engage in activities that circumvent the industry-level wage contract. 
In a small establishment it might not be very difficult to conceal a wage cut from the 
inspecting eyes of the central union. Similarly, a firm may reclassify workers into a 
lower job category. An alternative strategy is to change the remuneration system: 
workers agree to take a cut in their baseline pay, in exchange for bonus-pay, to be paid 
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full employment. Some versions of this approach build on the idea 
that workers’ loss aversion and money illusion lead to nominal 
wage rigidity. 
Evaluating the relevance of these and other theories has been a main purpose of 
the surveys shown in Table 1, and many of our own questions have the same 
motivation. 
Below we will not always draw a sharp distinction between mechanisms 
generating real and nominal wage rigidity. As argued by Ball and Romer 
(1990) and Hanes (2000), in the presence of small frictions that make it costly 
to change nominal prices, the mechanisms that generate real rigidity will also 
generate nominal rigidity. Also, in an environment of near-zero inflation it is 
difficult to distinguish between mechanisms generating real and nominal rigid-
ity. Finally, as noted by Campbell and Kamlani (1997, p. 764), the distinction 
between real and nominal wages has little meaning when asking firms why 
they do not try to lower wages during a recession, or how the structure of inter-
nal wages affect effort and morale. For these reasons, and because we were 
cautious not to trouble respondents with definitional issues, most of our ques-
tions deal with nominal wages.  
 
3.3 Our  statistical  analysis 
Many of our questions ask respondents to pick either of four or five options 
(e.g. “always, “often”, “sometimes”, “never”). We dichotomized these replies, 
so that each respondent was classified as belonging to either of two groups, 
those indicating that a certain phenomenon was common, and those indicating 
that it was less common.
9 We then performed a logit analysis, regressing the 
dichotomized response variable against a set of benchmark regressors. In alter-
native specifications we estimated ordered logit models (proportional odds), 
exploiting the full variation in our response variables. As we will see below 
most of the time it makes little difference to the results whether we estimate or-
dered or standard logit models.  
Our benchmark regressors, shown in Table 4, measure the characteristics of 
employees with respect to age, gender, immigrant status and schooling. These 
are variables that belong in an ordinary wage equation. In our baseline specifi- 
 
                                                       
9 To gain precision in our econometric analysis we divided respondents in as equally sized 
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Table 4. Explanatory variables used in the logit analysis 




   LOGSIZE  Ln(No. of employees of unit)   BR 3.68 1.35  885 
   UNIONDENSITY  Share of workforce that is unionized   Q 0.70 0.32  867 
   PERMCONTRACT  Share of employees with a permanent 
employment contract 
Q 0.85 0.20 879 
   FEMALE  Share of female employees  ER 0.41 0.25  845 
   NONNORDIC  Share of employees of non-Nordic origin  ER 0.07 0.12  845 
   AGE  Average age of workforce  ER 39.5 7.2  845 
   AGE*AGE  Square of AGE divided by 100     
   BASICSCHOOL  Share of employees with only basic 
schooling 
ER 0.21 0.18 845 
   UNIVERSITY  Share of employees with university  
education 
ER 0.33 0.28 845 
   MULTIUNIT  =1 if unit is part of multiunit enterprise   BR 0.58 0.49  885 
INDUSTRY      
   UNSKILLSER  =1 if unskilled service unit  BR 0.16 0.37  885 
   SKILLSER  =1 if skilled service unit  BR 0.25 0.43  885 
   PUBLIC  =1 if public unit  BR 0.29 0.45 885 
  (Manufacturing units used as reference)     
POPULATION     
   LOWPOP 
 
 
=1 if unit is in area with low population 
density (Statistics Sweden regional codes 
H5, H6) 
BR 0.11 0.32 885 
   MEDIUMPOP 
 
 
=1 if unit is in area with average popula-
tion density (Statistics Sweden regional 
codes H3, H4) 
BR 0.49 0.50 885 
  (Units located in areas with high popula-
tion density used as reference) 
  
Notes: In the third column, BR stands for the Business Register of Statistics Sweden, Q for the 
questionnaire, and ER for the Employment Register of Statistics Sweden. 
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cation we use three dummies to control for sectoral affiliation. We treat manu-
facturing as our comparison group, and include dummies for unskilled services, 
skilled services and public administration. We also report specifications where 
we introduce dummies for sectoral affiliation at a more detailed level, primarily 
based on the two-digit SIC code. There are two dummies indicating population 
density. We treat units in an area with high population density as the compari-
son group, and we view MEDIUMPOP and LOWPOP as indicators of the size 
of the local labor market. Finally, there is a dummy indicating whether a unit 
belongs to a multi-plant enterprise. 
Our benchmark specification also includes variables that might be of par-
ticular relevance for students of wage rigidity. The first is the number of em-
ployees per unit, LOGSIZE. Size might be related to wage rigidity for various 
reasons. Large units may find it more difficult to monitor their workers, and 
wage rigidity may then be associated with size because efficiency 
wage/shirking mechanisms play a greater role in large units (Rebitzer and Rob-
inson (1991)). Alternatively, if employee bargaining power is positively corre-
lated with firm size, wages should be more rigid in large firms. One way of ra-
tionalizing such a correlation is by noting that to the extent that capital intensity 
is higher in larger firms, large firms will be more vulnerable to strikes and 
other disruptions of the work process. Because of this workers in large firms 
have greater power in the local wage bargain.
10  
To further explore the role of bargaining and unions we introduce two addi-
tional variables, the share of employees that belong to a union, UNIONDEN-
SITY, and the share of employees that hold a permanent employment contract, 
PERMCONTRACT. The idea behind the latter variable is that workers’ bar-
gaining strength ought to be an increasing function of the share of employees 
who hold a permanent employment contract. One should note, though, that 
PERMCONTRACT is probably also correlated with the stock of firm-specific 
human skills. In firms where long-term employment relationships are common, 
there is a stronger incentive to invest resources in firm-specific skill formation; 
see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Holden (2001).  
                                                       
10 Hanes (2000) uses U.S. data on wage changes by industries during the downturns of three ma-
jor business cycles to examine the causes of wage rigidity, and argues that rigidity is the most 
pronounced in capital intensive industries. He also shows that capital intensity is highly corre-
lated with firm size. Unfortunately, we have no data on capital stocks for the firms included in 
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To test the validity of our background data, Table 5 shows the results when 
we regress (average) earnings against our explanatory variables. All coeffi-
cients are precisely estimated, and in agreement with the microeconomic wage 
equations for Sweden reported in Albaek et al. (1998) and Arai (2001). As was 
the case in these studies the coefficient on LOGSIZE is positive, a result that 
remains as we bring in controls for sectoral affiliation at the two-digit level (** 
and * denote significance at the one and five percent levels).
11 The coefficient 
on PERMCONTRACT enters with a positive sign, in line with the conjecture 
that permanent contracts ought to be correlated with employee bargaining 
strength and/or firm-specific skills. The variable UNIONDENSITY enters with 
a counterintuitive negative sign.
12 Arai (2001) reports a similar result, and con-
cludes that the negative union-wage effect reflects a selection of low-wage 
workers into unions. The point estimate of the coefficient on FEMALE in col-
umn 3 implies that an increase in the share of female employees by 10 percent-
age points (e.g. from .4 to .5) lowers average earnings by 4 percent.  
 
 
4  The incidence of nominal wage cuts 
The new macroeconomic regime established during the 1990s, with a large in-
crease in unemployment, and a return of price stability, suggests a climate con-
ducive to the downward flexibility of nominal wages.
13 To assess the incidence 
of wage cuts, we asked respondents the following: 
 
Have wages (regular hourly wage, monthly salary, piece wage, 
etc.) been reduced at any time at your workplace during the crisis 
years of the 1990s? (See Question 1a in Appendix 2.) 
 
 
                                                       
11 For an overview of the evidence on the size-earnings effect, see Oi and Idson (1999).  
12 Though the coefficient on UNIONDENSITY in column 3 is precisely estimated, it is not large 
in absolute terms. The coefficient of -.127 implies that an increase in union density by 10 per-
centage points (e.g. from .5 to .6) lowers average earnings by 1.27 percent.  
13 During the twentieth century Sweden has experienced macroeconomic contractions with total 
unemployment (including those enrolled in labor market programs) reaching 12 percent or more 
on three occasions, 1921–22, 1931–33, and the 1990s. Across-the-board wage cuts were the rule 
rather than the exception in 1921–22, and common (but not extensive) in 1931–33. See Fregert 
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Table 5. The validity of our background data: OLS earnings-equations 
Explanatory variables   Dependent variable: LOGEARNING 
  



















































































2 R   .64 .65 .67 
No. of observations  824  824  824 
Notes: The dependent variable (the log of average annual earnings) is calculated via the tax regis-
ters, included in the Employment register of Statistics Sweden. All regressions include a constant, 
MULTIUNIT, LOWPOP and MEDIUMPOP. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at five percent level, ** denotes significance at one percent level.  
 
                                                       
14 Our units were classified into nine categories based on the SIC-codes: K72; K73; part of K74; 
D20–21 and 23–27; D28–35; D15–19, 22 and 36–37; H55; L75111–75212, 75231, 75232 and 
75300; L75221–75226 and 75233–75250.     
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As shown in Table 6, 28 units replied in the affirmative, which implies that 3.2 
percent of all units had experienced a regular wage cut. Wage cuts were the 
least common in the public sector (where only one unit had cut pay), and the 
most common in skilled services (12 units had cut pay). Simple t-tests reveal 
that wage-cutting units differ in important respects. First, they are significantly 
smaller; the average number of employees is 67.6 in the sub-sample of wage 
cutting units and 97.8 in the sample of non-cutters. Among the smallest units 
with less than 20 employees (300 units in all), 4.7 percent indicated some ex-
perience with nominal wage cuts. Among the largest units with more than 100 
employees (283 in all), 2.1 percent indicated the same. Second, they are sig-
nificantly less unionized; the average unionization rates of the two sub-samples 
are 52.8 and 71 percent, respectively. Third, wage-cutting units are signifi-
cantly more prone to operate a profit sharing scheme with wide coverage; the 
average percentages of employees covered by profit sharing are 64.3 and 30.7 
percent, respectively (these numbers are exclusive of the nonprofit, govern-
mental, sector).  
 
Table 6. Frequency of nominal wage cuts (defined as cut in regular hourly or 
monthly wages, or piece rates) during the “crisis years” of the 1990s 





wage cuts in 
sector (in per-
cent)







wage cuts in 
sector 
 (in percent) 
Manufacturing 9 3.4 2 0.8 
Unskilled services   6 4.3 0 0.0 
Skilled services  12 5.5 7 3.2 
Public administration  1 0.4 0 0.0 
Total 28 3.2 9 1.0 
Notes: The figures shown in the third and fifth columns are the percentage of all firms in the sec-
tor that have experienced a wage cut. We define a comprehensive wage cut as a wage cut that 
covers at least 50 percent of the employees at a given unit.  
 
Twenty-one units provided us with information about the share of employ-
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for a quite small group of employees.
15 If we confine attention to those units 
that replied that they, first, had cut pay, and, second, had done so for a majority 
of their employees, we arrive at the nine units shown in the second column of 
Table 6. Seven of these nine units belong in the skilled service sector. Some re-
spondents provided written comments that give some guidance on the circum-
stances surrounding their pay cuts. One manufacturing unit wrote that metal 
workers’ union ruled out wage cuts for blue-collar workers, but that “white-
collar workers on a somewhat higher level” had taken wage cuts. Another 
manufacturing unit replied that it had temporarily lowered pay by 8–9 percent 
in the early 1990s, but that the “money was paid back” as soon as the firm was 
back on its feet. One unit in skilled services wrote that pay had been lowered 
for white-collar workers who had been re-assigned to less qualified jobs.  
Downward wage rigidity appears to be a pervasive phenomenon in Sweden. 
Although we cover a period of 5–6 consecutive years of very high unemploy-
ment and near-zero inflation, only 3.2 percent of our local units indicated that 
they had any experience with a cut in regular nominal pay. Since these units are 
concentrated to strata that are less important in terms of total employment, the 
incidence of nominal wage cuts is even lower from the perspective of the indi-
vidual employee. In all, our twelve strata represent a population of 1.141 mil-
lion workers. Some calculations show that our results on the incidence of wage 
cuts imply that no more than 1.1 percent of these employees experienced a 
regular wage cut during the slump of the 1990s (the 95% confidence interval 
for this estimate is 0.5%–1.7%).
16  
                                                       
15 Eight units replied that the wage cut had affected less than 10 percent of their employees, four 
units that the wage cut affected between 10 and 40 percent of their employees, and nine units that 
the wage cut affected more than 70 percent of their employees.  
16 In deriving these numbers, we proceeded as follows. For each sampled unit that had existed at 
least since January 1994, and thus had been in operation during the severe recession, we com-
puted the number of employees who had experienced/not experienced a nominal wage cut. For 
units that provided no information about the share of employees who received a wage cut, we 
simply invoked the average share (42.8%) for units that provided this information. To aggregate 
to the population level, we used the information about each stratum’s share of total employment. 
In computing the 95% confidence interval (defined by the the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles) for the 
statistic we generated a bootstrap distribution with 10,000 elements.  
The numbers presented in the main text are not very sensitive to the assumptions made. If we 
assume that the average share of employees who experienced a wage cut is 20 rather than 42.8 
percent in units that did not provide this information, the estimated share of employees who ex-
perienced a wage cut falls to 0.89 percent. Raising the average share of employees who experi-
enced a wage cut to 60 percent increases the same estimate to 1.26 percent. We also repeated the 
calculation including also those units that had begun operation between 1994 and 1998. The es-
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For comparison, Agell and Lundborg (2002) find that not a single one of the 
159 large manufacturing firms that they surveyed had implemented a compre-
hensive wage cut during the years of the crisis. Our stratum of large manufac-
turing units consists of 83 units; two of these indicated that they had cut pay, 
but none of them had done so in a comprehensive manner. Ekberg (2002) stud-
ies the incidence of wage cuts in the Swedish private sector using establish-
ment-level data collected by the Confederation of Swedish Industries. He fo-
cuses on the development of the “baseline hourly wage”, and he considers an-
nual wage changes for employees that stay on the same job. His results for 
white-collar workers are quite comparable to the ones we report here; between 
1996–99 1.15 percent of all white-collar workers received a cut in baseline pay. 
Like us, he also finds that the incidence of wage cuts is significantly higher 
among smaller firms.
17  
A number of studies have examined the extent of wage rigidity in other 
countries. Fortin (1996) reports that during the Canadian recession of the early 
1990s, when inflation averaged 1.2 percent and unemployment reached 11 per-
cent, 5.7 percent of non-union settlements without cost of living adjustments 
included nominal wage cuts.
18 Evidence suggesting that nominal wage rigidity 
is an important phenomenon has also been reported for Switzerland by Fehr 
and Goette (2000), and for Germany by Beissinger and Knoppik (2001). Smith 
(2000) presents evidence suggesting that nominal wages in Britain are quite 
flexible. The U.S. evidence is voluminous, and somewhat conflicting. 
McLaughlin (1994) concludes that wage rigidity is an unimportant phenome-
non, while Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) suggest that this finding is due to 
measurement errors in the raw data. Using establishment data Lebow, Saks and 
                                                                                                                                 
timated percent of employees that had experienced a nominal wage was then 1.18 (0.60%–
1.88%). 
17 Ekberg’s results for blue-collar workers are more puzzling. For the period 1997–98 he reports 
that 19.4 percent of blue-collar workers received a cut in baseline pay. In assessing this finding it 
is important to note that during the second-half of the 1990s the industry-level wage agreements 
for blue-collar workers were designed in a way that in effect ruled out cuts in nominal baseline 
pay (see our discussion above). Based on this fact we would certainly expect cuts in nominal 
baseline pay to be less common among blue-collar workers than among white-collar workers. As 
pointed out by Ekberg the high incidence of nominal wage cuts among blue-collar workers is 
most likely an artifact of measurement errors in the raw data (misreporting of work–hours, con-
fusion of flexible and fixed components of pay, confusion of retroactive pay and regular pay 
hikes, etc). 
18 Christofides and Stengos (2000) analyze the wage-change distributions in Canadian union con-
tracts between 1976–1999, and find evidence of pronounced nominal rigidity.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   26
Wilson (1999) report evidence of nominal wage rigidity, and Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1994) report an almost complete absence of nominal wage cuts.  
Because data sources and methodology differ between studies, it is not easy 
to compare the extent of nominal wage rigidity in different countries. Even so, 
it seems safe to conclude that Sweden is one of the countries where nominal 
wage cuts are the least common. In this context it is important to note that our 
results on the incidence of wage cuts in Sweden were registered during a pro-
longed period of severe economic slack and very low inflation. With the possi-
ble exception of the evidence for Canada and Switzerland, studies for other 
countries concern periods with stronger macroeconomic performance.  
 
 
5  The sources of wage rigidity 
Why are wages so rigid? This section presents our survey evidence with a di-
rect bearing on the mechanisms of wage rigidity.  
 
5.1 Bargaining  institutions 
As discussed in Section 3 Swedish wage bargaining institutions can be ex-
pected to generate a substantial amount of nominal wage rigidity. Since Swed-
ish job protection legislation prevents firms from imposing unilateral wage 
cuts, wage concessions only ought to take place in firms where a major part of 
the jobs is at stake. Moreover, the system of two-tier wage bargaining makes it 
difficult for the parties at the local level to cut pay. The following observations 
suggest that these institutions may help to explain the low incidence of wage 
cuts in our sample.  
First, evidence reported below shows that most firms believe that Swedish 
job protection creates important costs of hirings and firings. This finding vindi-
cates the key assumption in Holden’s (1994, 2002) analysis of labor law as a 
basic source of wage rigidity. In his model, a wage cut requires a mutual 
agreement between firm and union or worker. Furthermore, the firm is not al-
lowed to fire the worker, and then to offer a new job at a lower wage. It is the 
combination of these two legal features that gives workers a strategic advan-
tage when they try to prevent a cut in nominal wages.  
Second, two-tier wage bargaining is the least common in the skilled service 
sector. At the other extreme is the public sector, where collective wage bargain-
ing is the rule. Based on this, we would expect the incidence of wage cuts to be IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  27
significantly lower in the public sector than in the skilled service sector. A sta-
tistical test of the frequencies reported in Table 6 shows that this is indeed the 
case. Third, as noted in Section 4 union density is significantly lower in the 
sample of wage cutting units. Since union density can be expected to be a good 
indicator of the importance of two-tier bargaining, this discrepancy between the 
two samples is another indication that collective bargaining matters for wage 
rigidity.  
Finally, it is instructive to compare our results with corresponding ones for 
Switzerland, a country with different labor market institutions but a similar 
macroeconomic experience. In Switzerland firms are allowed to fire workers 
who refuse to accept a lower wage. As suggested by Fehr and Goette (2000, p. 
4), “...the Swiss labor market is perhaps closer to the US labor market than to 
the labor markets in most other European countries.” Moreover, in the 1990s 
Switzerland went through a recession almost as severe and prolonged as the 
Swedish one, with several consecutive years of very low nominal GDP 
growth.
19  
Fehr and Goette (2000) find that downward wage rigidity in Switzerland is a 
robust phenomenon. Despite a depressed labor market, and despite that Swiss 
firms can impose unilateral wage cuts, many workers received wage freezes in-
stead of cuts. Evidence from two large Swiss firms suggest that roughly one 
percent of workers received wage cuts during each year of the crisis. This is 
roughly comparable to our own estimate for Sweden, suggesting that between 
0.5 and 1.8 percent of workers received a wage cut. Our numbers, however, 
apply for a representative sample of firms, and they show the percentage of 
workers that received a wage cut at least once during the complete time span of 
the Swedish recession. When Fehr and Goette turn to evidence from more rep-
resentative sources, they find – after correcting for measurement errors in their 
raw data – that between 2.3 and 6.4 percent of all workers received a wage cut 
                                                       
19 Swiss GDP growth was negative between 1991 and 1993 (as it was in Sweden), and between 
1994 and 1996 real growth was always less than 0.5 percent, see Fehr and Goette (2000). Be-
tween 1993 and 1997 the inflation rate was never above 1.6 percent. Though these figures are 
roughly comparable to the Swedish ones (see our Introduction), the Swedish recession was ac-
companied by much more substantial slack in the labor market. According to the standardized 
unemployment definition of the OECD (which gives an incomplete coverage of workers enrolled 
in various labor market programs), unemployment in 1990 was 0.5 percent in Switzerland and 
1.7 percent in Sweden. In 1993 standardized unemployment was 4.0 percent in Switzerland and 
9.1 percent in Sweden, and in 1997 (which is the year when unemployment peaked in both coun-
tries) the corresponding figures were 4.2 and 9.9 percent, respectively. (Source: OECD (2000)).  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   28
during each year of the Swiss recession. Thus, while wage rigidity was nearly 
complete in our sample wage cuts were considerably more common in Switzer-
land. This result is consistent with the view that institutions can lead to down-
ward wage rigidity.  
 
5.2  Wage competition from the unemployed 
Downward rigidity of hiring pay during a recession could be due either to the 
absence of active wage competition from the unemployed, or to firms’ unwill-
ingness to hire underbidders. Solow (1990) argues that the former reason is the 
more important one, and that there is a social norm preventing the unemployed 
from underbidding. The empirical evidence is scant, and inconclusive. Both 
Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002) and Bewley (1999) report that underbidding 
is uncommon, but not unheard of.  
An explicit offer to work for a wage which is lower than the going one is 
perhaps not the most obvious method of underbidding incumbent employees. 
There are subtler but equivalent strategies that can be adopted by an unem-
ployed worker who wants to undercut existing jobholders. To quantify the fre-
quency of undercutting in this broad sense, we asked respondents the follow-
ing:  
 
Does it happen that your workplace is approached by job seekers 
who offer to work under conditions that are inferior (lower pay, 
less convenient hours, poorer work environment, etc.) to those you 
normally offer new employees with corresponding qualifications? 
(Question 3a) 
 
Because of the general phrasing of the question, we expected many firms to an-
swer our question in the affirmative. But this was not the case, as can be seen in 
Table 7. Though some units indicated that job seekers sometimes offer to work 
at lower (effective) pay, underbidding appears to be uncommon in all our 
strata. In all, only 119 units (13.5 percent) indicated that they had encountered 
underbidders. The incidence of underbidding is highest among small units in 
unskilled services (22.7 percent), and lowest among large units in skilled ser-
vices (6.8 percent). This low incidence appears roughly consistent with Solow's IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  29




Table 7. Incidence of underbidding, and of employers’ rejection of underbid-
ders 
Sector   No. of units 
reporting that 







No. of units 
reporting that 
they have 
always  refused 
the offer
Rejection rate  
(in percent) 
Manufacturing 34 12.6 32 97.0 
Unskilled services  27 19.4 24 92.3 
Skilled services  29 13.4 24 85.7 
Public administration  29 11.4 23 82.1 
Total 119 13.5 103 89.6 
Notes: Four of the 119 firms that replied that they had been contacted by underbidders did not 
answer our question on whether they had rejected the offer. The rejection rates shown in the final 
column only applies for the 115 firms that responded to this last question.   
 
It is equally striking to note that 90 percent of the respondents who had been 
contacted by an underbidder had always rejected the offer, see Table 7. Bewley 
(1999) reports that most of the managers he interviewed rejected low-wage of-
fers, and Agell and Lundborg (1995) find the same tendency in their survey of 
Swedish manufacturing. Here, we find that rejection of underbidders is a gen-
eral phenomenon, pertaining to firms in all sectors, and in all size
21 categories. 
We asked respondents to rank the reasons for rejection; see Table 8. For units 
in manufacturing and skilled services, concerns about personnel policy and in-
ternal conflict were ranked as the most important factors, i.e. factors empha-
sized in some efficiency wage models, and in some insider-outsider models 
(see Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). For public sector units, unions and the col-
lective bargaining contract were far more important (it should be noted that un-
ion density exceeds 90 percent in all public sector strata, see Table 4).  
                                                       
20 The low incidence of underbidding is also consistent with the observation that the Swedish 
welfare state reduces substantially the income loss from unemployment. For data on net replace-
ment rates in Sweden and other OECD-countries, see OECD (1999).  
21 Among units with less than 20 employees, the rejection rate is 90.2 percent, and among units 
with more than 200 employees it is 86.7 percent.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   30
Table 8. Most important reasons to reject underbidders 
Percentage of respondents that rank the reason as most important 








Violates firm’s personnel 
policy; creates internal 
conflicts  
41.7 32.6 37.2 29.5 
No available vacancies  37.0 29.9 42.0 28.5 
Violates collective  
bargaining agreement;  
unions resist underbidders 
18.2 33.0 16.4 42.1 
Underbidders have  
inferior skills 
3.1 4.5  4.5  0.0 
Notes: The percentages shown in the four columns are based on the replies of 33, 22, 26 and 25 
units, respectively. 
 
We conclude that lack of wage competition is probably not a main reason 
why wage cuts were so rare during the macroeconomic bust. While underbid-
ding is uncommon, firms’ nearly always reject such offers.
22 Judged against 
these rejection rates, the low incidence of underbidding is not surprising. We 
conclude that understanding the reasons for wage rigidity at the hiring margin 
requires that the searchlight is aimed at the firm and its incumbent employees, 
rather than at the unemployed job seeker. In this context it is suggestive that 
less than five percent of managers who rejected underbidders pointed to the ex-
planation “underbidders have inferior skills”, see Table 8.  
 
5.3  Wages, monitoring and effort 
Some of our questions were designed to shed light on how managers perceived 
the link between wages and effort, and to what extent the strength of these 
mechanisms depended on the characteristics of firms and workers. A basic con-
sideration in models of motivation is whether firms can observe work perform-
ance. When we asked, “to what extent can you evaluate whether a specific em-
                                                       
22 Fehr and Falk (1999) report results from experimental labor markets, suggesting that firms re-
fuse to hire underbidders. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) study a wage setting game, in 
which workers are motivated by reciprocity. In their model the firm rejects underbidders in equi-
librium.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  31
ployee performs satisfactorily on the job?”, 50.7 percent indicated that they 
could evaluate performance “to a very great extent”, and 49.3 percent indicated 
that they were less than certain about performance. 
Table 9 reports our logit analysis (conducted along the lines outlined in Sec-
tion 3.3) of the determinants of employers’ ability to appraise performance. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient on LOGSIZE is negative and highly sig-
nificant. We obtain similar results (see column 2) when we regress respon-
dents’ assessment of their ability to appraise team performance against the 
same variables. The inverse relation between unit size and ability to appraise 
work performance is robust, surviving a range of sensitivity tests reported be-
low. Few of our other benchmark regressors turned out to be statistically sig-
nificant. Local unions might interfere with the monitoring strategies of firms, 
highly educated workers normally hold more complicated jobs that can be ex-
pected to be more difficult to monitor, etc. However, neither of UNIONDEN-
SITY nor UNIVERSITY was remotely close to statistical significance (results 
not shown). Among our sectoral controls, the coefficient on PUBLIC is nega-
tive and highly significant – compared to managers in manufacturing, those in 
public units are significantly less able to appraise work performance. The coef-
ficient on FEMALE is positive and statistically significant in column 2, but this 
result disappears once we introduce finer sectoral controls. As we will see in 
Section 8, there are other partial correlations involving FEMALE that appear to 
be robust. 
Most efficiency wage models predict that changes in external wages have an 
impact on work effort. This is true of the canonical shirking model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), and it applies for those versions of the gift-exchange model 
of Akerlof (1982) in which workers’ norms of comparison extend to workers in 
other firms. We asked respondents how they thought that an increase in exter-
nal wages would affect effort at their own unit. As can be seen from Figure 1 a 
great majority (581 out of 882 respondents) thought that higher wages in com-
parable companies or organizations would lower effort at their own unit.
23 We  
 
                                                       
23 Only eight percent of our respondents indicated that lower unemployment would reduce effort. 
Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002) report substantial evidence that increased unemployment leads 
to increased effort. A reconciliation of these responses, obtained in years with low (1991) and 
high (1999) unemployment, is that unemployment has a stronger effect on effort when unem-
ployment is low. Other studies indicating that labor market tightness have an effect on effort are 
Drago and Heywood (1992) for the USA and Agell (1994) for Sweden.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   32














































Industry dummies  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  .039 .061 .043 .038 
No.  of  obs.  823 752 822 815 
No. of dependent 
variable=1  
424 389 543 395 
Notes: The dependent variables were constructed from the answers to Questions 5a–b, 6b, and 
11a. In all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the 
one percent level. 
 
view this as a strong indication that most firms perceive themselves to have an 
incentive to maintain external wage relations. This finding differs radically 
from the results of Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999). Though 
these surveys report significant evidence that effort and work moral respond to 
internal pay and internal pay structures, external pay appears to play little role. 
In Section 5.7 we show results suggesting that the high union density in Swe-
den can explain these differences between countries.  
Our finding that managers in small units find it easier to evaluate perform-
ance suggests that size might also matter for the link between outside wages 
and effort. This is precisely what we find, see column 3 of Table 9. Managers 
in large firms are significantly more prone to identify a negative link between 
external wages and effort.  
 IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  33
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Figure 1. “How do you think that the work effort of your employees would be affected 
if wages/salaries increased in comparable firms or organizations, but stayed the same at 
your unit?” (882 respondents) 
 
A large experimental literature suggests that reciprocity is an important mo-
tivational factor in the labor market, and that workers who feel that their pay is 
unfair respond by reducing effort, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Gächter 
and Fehr (2001). We asked: “In your opinion, do those of your employees who 
are dissatisfied with their pay normally reduce performance?”. Forty-nine per-
cent of our respondents (427 managers) answered in the affirmative, 28.9 per-
cent answered that such a response was possible but not common, while 22.1 
percent ruled out the possibility altogether. Table 9, column 4, reports our 
econometric analysis of the link between effort and wage dissatisfaction. 
Again, there is a highly significant coefficient on LOGSIZE, suggesting that 
managers in large units are more inclined to believe that disgruntled workers 
reduce effort. We also find an intriguing gender effect (see Section 8 for further 
analysis); the negative and highly significant coefficient on FEMALE seems to 
suggest that managers with a large share of female employees worry less about 
negative reciprocity.  
Is the size effect robust? Table 10 shows our sensitivity analysis. Row 1 re-
produces the estimated coefficients on LOGSIZE from Table 9. In row 2, we 
can see that the Spearman rank correlations between the left-hand side vari-
ables and LOGSIZE are highly significant. Row 3 shows the results from a IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   34
Table 10. The influence of LOGSIZE on effort and motivation: stability analysis 
Model estimated  Explanatory   Dependent variable  
  variable(s) for  








wages lowers effort 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Employees who feel 
underpaid reduce  
effort (1=yes, 0=no) 








2. Spearman rank  
    correlation  
LOGSIZE -.144**  -.126**  .162**  .166** 
















5. Logit, with two dummy  
    variables for No of 
D1=1, if no of em-









    employees  D2=1, if no of  









6. Logit, excluding 









7. Logit, excluding 









Notes: The table shows the coefficient, with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at 
the one percent level. Except for model 2, the explanatory variables are those of Table 4. The dependent variables were constructed from the re-
plies to Questions 5a–b, 6b and 11a. In Models 1, 3, and 5–6 the dependent variables are defined as (1=yes, 0=no). In model 2 and 4 the dependent 
variables are given as the ordinal response to the relevant questions. In model 3 variables were eliminated according to a stepwise backward proce-
dure (the table shows the coefficient on LOGSIZE in the final specification). First, the full model including all explanatory variables was esti-
mated. Second, the least significant variable was removed if insignificant (p>0.05). Third, the model was reestimated. This procedure was repeated 
until all remaining variables were significant. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  35
 
procedure of stepwise elimination of insignificant explanatory variables (start-
ing with the full set of regressors of Table 4). According to this procedure, 
LOGSIZE always belongs in the final set of significant explanatory variables. 
Row 4 shows the consequences of adding more information about the left-hand 
side variables. Instead of dichotomizing respondents’ replies to our questions, 
we exploit all the variation of the original answers and proceed by estimating 
ordered logit models. LOGSIZE remains significant at the one percent level in 
all columns.  
Row 5 shows the results when we replace LOGSIZE with dummy variables 
for small and medium-sized units (units with more than 100 employees consti-
tute the reference category). In all columns the dummy for the smallest units, 
with less than 20 employees, is significant at the five-percent level. However, 
the dummy for the category of medium-sized units is only significant in col-
umns 2 and 4. Rows 6 and 7 show the results of re-estimating our basic model 
for various subsets of our full sample. The coefficients on LOGSIZE are esti-
mated with much lower precision as we drop all small- and medium-sized 
units. In row 7, all coefficients are insignificant at the five percent level, and 
two of them change sign. Thus, the reason we identify a size-effect appears to 
be that our survey includes a reasonably sized sample of units with less than 
100 employees.  
How should one interpret these size-effects? A tempting explanation for our 
empirical results is as follows. Assume that large organizations have greater 
difficulties in monitoring work effort than smaller ones. The canonical shirking 
model would then lead us to believe that work effort in larger organizations is 
more responsive to external pay. Because of the inferior monitoring capacity of 
larger organizations we would also expect such organizations to find it more 
difficult to prevent acts of negative reciprocity. However, some specification 
tests suggest that this explanation is probably wrong, or at least too simplistic. 
If the coefficients on LOGSIZE in Table 9 only capture the inferior moni-
toring capacity of large firms they would not remain significant if we added a 
direct measure of monitoring capacity to the estimating equation. In Table 11, 
column 1, we reproduce the statistically significant coefficient on LOGSIZE 
from the equation describing the relation between external pay and effort in 
Table 9. In the second column we report the results when we include MONI-
TOR1, (managers’ own assessment of their ability to evaluate individual effort, 
a variable constructed from Question 5a) among our regressors. In column 3 IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   36
we rather include MONITOR2 (managers’ assessment of their ability to evalu-
ate team effort, constructed from Question 5b). In columns 4–6 we examine 
how the introduction of MONITOR1 and MONITOR2 affect the coefficient on 
LOGSIZE in the equation describing the relation between pay dissatisfaction 
and effort . The coefficients on MONITOR1 and MONITOR2 have the nega-
tive sign predicted by the shirking model, and in column 3 the coefficient on 
MONITOR2 is statistically significant at the one percent level. However, 
LOGSIZE remains significant in all specifications, though the significance lev-
els decrease somewhat as we add the monitoring variables. We conclude that 
LOGSIZE and our two monitoring variables primarily capture different 
mechanisms, and that our finding that external pay and reciprocity matter more 
for effort in larger organizations is not primarily due to the insufficient moni-
toring capacity of larger organizations.  
 
Table 11. LOGSIZE and monitoring: sensitivity analysis  
Explanatory variables   Dependent variable 
  Higher external wages  
lowers effort 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Employees who feel  
underpaid reduce effort 
(1=yes, 0=no) 















MONITOR1   -.205 
(.156) 
   -.155 
(.148) 
 
MONITOR2     -.517** 
(.168) 
   -.186 
(.157) 
Industry dummies  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  .043 .045 .046 .038 .039 .039 
No.  of  obs.    822 822 751 815 814 743 
No. of dependent  
variable=1 
543 543 506 395 395 369 
Notes: The dependent variables are constructed from the answers to Question 6b and 11a. The 
estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. MONITOR1 and MONITOR2 are dummy vari-
ables constructed from the answers to Questions 5a and 5b respectively. Values equal to 1 corre-
spond to respondents who indicate that they can judge performance to a very great extent. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** sig-
nificance at the one percent level. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  37
Summing up, the results of this section show that many human resource 
managers believe that effort and work moral is responsive to firm’s wage pol-
icy, as predicted by efficiency wage theory. Two-thirds of our respondents be-
lieve that a ceteris paribus increase in outside wages damages performance at 
their workplace, and almost fifty percent indicate that employees who are dis-
satisfied with their pay normally reduce effort. We have also identified a robust 
size-effect: human resource managers in larger organizations know less about 
work performance, indicate that increases in external wages have a stronger 
adverse effect on effort, and are more inclined to believe that workers who feel 
lowly paid reduce effort.  
 
5.4  Wages and voluntary turnover 
An important result of Campbell and Kamlani (1997) is that wages are kept 
rigid out of fear that wage cuts would increase quits and labor turnover, and 
that this mechanism is most important for white-collar workers. We asked, “In 
your opinion, do those of your employees who feel unhappy about their pay 
normally seek employment elsewhere?”. Out of 880 responding managers, 58.5 
percent replied in the affirmative, 29.4 percent indicated that voluntary turn-
over was possible but uncommon, while 12.1 percent ruled out this possibility 
altogether. From these responses it is hard to escape the conclusion that man-
agers perceive the risk of voluntary turnover as an important constraint on their 
wage policy.  
Table 12 reports our results on the determinants of the risk of quits. Column 
1 shows our benchmark logit specification, column 2 introduces two-digit con-
trols for sectoral affiliation, and column 3 shows the results from an ordered 
logit regression, which restores the original variation in the response variable. 
Most of the partial correlations make intuitive sense. The positive coefficient 
on UNIVERSITY indicates that the risk of quits is greater in units with a large 
share of highly educated employees. The negative coefficient on LOWPOP 
suggests that the risk of quits is significantly lower in areas with a small local 
labor market. The negative coefficient on PERMCONTRACT (which is only 
significant at the ten percent level in columns 1 and 2) implies that the risk of 
quits is lower in case of tenured employees. To the extent that firm-specific 
skills are greater in units with employees on permanent contracts, this correla-
tion is what we would expect. It is not obvious how to interpret the negative 
coefficient on UNIONDENSITY, suggesting that the risk of voluntary turnover 
is smaller in highly unionized firms. It is useful, though, to recall Arai’s (2001) IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   38
finding that there appears to be a selection of low-wage workers into unions in 
Swedish microeconomic data. Based on this, one may conjecture that the nega-
tive coefficient reflects the possibility that dissatisfied union members have 
worse outside options than dissatisfied nonunion workers. 
 





  Employees who feel 
underpaid seek other 
jobs 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Employees who feel 
underpaid seek other 
jobs 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Employees who feel 
underpaid seek other 
jobs 

































Industry dummies  Table 4  Two-digit  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo R-squared  .081 .093 .048 
No. of obs.  821 821 821 
No. of dependent  
variable=1  
485 485  -- 
Notes: The dependent variable was constructed from the answers to Questions 11b. In columns 
1–2 the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. In column 3 the estimation method is 
maximum likelihood ordered logit (five response categories). Standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent 
level. 
 
Summing up, many managers see a link between wages and voluntary turn-
over. This mechanism of wage rigidity appears particularly relevant for the 
high-end of the labor market, i.e. for firms with a workforce that is highly edu-
cated, lowly unionized and have access to a large local labor market.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  39
5.5  Benefits and effort 
The shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) predicts that more generous 
unemployment benefits induce workers to slacken off. We asked: “How do you 
think that the work effort of your employees would be affected if unemploy-
ment benefits were increased?”. Though a large majority believed that higher 
external wages led to lower effort, few respondents thought the same of higher 
benefits. Among 876 respondents, only 125 (14.3 percent) replied that more 
generous benefits would induce their employees to reduce effort. Further in-
spection shows that benefits might still play a relatively important role for the 
low-end of the labor market. While only 8.3 percent of firms in the skilled ser-
vice sector believed that higher benefits would reduce effort, 28 percent of 
firms in the unskilled service sector responded the same.  
Table 13 shows our statistical analysis of the link between effort and bene-
fits. The coefficients on PERMCONTRACT and BASICSCHOOL are highly 
significant across specifications. According to the specification in column 1 
firms with a large share of employees on temporary contracts, and with a large 
share of lowly educated workers, are significantly more prone to identify a 
negative link between benefits and effort. These partial correlations remain 
significant as we introduce controls for sectoral affiliation in column 2. Work-
ers who are lowly educated and hold temporary contracts are also lowly paid, 
and column 3 shows that the coefficient on LOGEARNING is negative in a 
one-explanatory-variable logit regression: firms with below-average earnings 
are significantly more likely to indicate that benefits play a role for effort. In 
column 4 we add LOGEARNING to our benchmark explanatory variables. 
Since our benchmark set includes all the variables that appear in a conventional 
earnings-equation, it is no surprise that the coefficient on LOGEARNING is 
small, and imprecisely estimated. PERMCONTRACT and BASICSCHOOL 
remain significant.  
On the whole, we do not find much evidence that unemployment benefits 
create wage rigidity via their impact on work morale and effort. But benefits 
might play a significant role for the low-end of the labor market. For this seg-
ment of the labor market, where wages are low and temporary contracts more 
common, we can not rule out that the benefit system is an important source of 
wage rigidity.  
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Table 13. Logit analysis of link between effort and unemployment benefits 
Explanatory  
variables  
Dependent variable:  
Higher unemployment benefits lower effort 
(1=yes, 0=no) 























Industry dummies  No  Table 4  No  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  No  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  .101 .103 .043 .103 
No.  of  obs.  818 818 836 818 
No. of dependent  
variable=1  
113 113 118 113 
Notes: The variable LOGEARNING is the log of annual earnings, also used as the dependent 
variable in Table 5. The dependent variable was constructed from the answers to Question 6c. In 
all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. Standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent 
level.  
 
5.6  Rent-sharing and bargaining strength 
A large class of models links unemployment and wage rigidity to the bargain-
ing power of incumbent workers. An implication of all these models, which 
differentiates them from e.g. the competitive model and models of efficiency 
wages, is that workers capture a share of the firm’s surplus in the bargain. We 
asked: 
 
How common is it that your employees (or their union representa-
tives) require wage hikes because of high profits, or high ability to 
pay, in your firm/organization? (Question 10c) 
 
The answers suggest that profits/ability to pay is an important factor in manu-
facturing and skilled services, but a more marginal factor in unskilled services 
and the public sector. In manufacturing and skilled services 43.5 and 48.2 per-IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  41
cent of respondents indicated that workers always/frequently/sometimes re-
quire higher wages in times of high profits/ability to pay. In unskilled services 
and public administration, the corresponding numbers were 20.9 and 17.0 per-
cent, respectively.  
We used the replies to Question 10c to create proxy-variables for the rent 
sharing, or bargaining strength, of employees. The argument is that in a firm 
where the employer has all the bargaining power workers would never require 
higher wages because of high profits/ability to pay, while the opposite would 
apply in a firm where workers have all the bargaining power. Our first proxy 
variable is constructed from the dichotomized responses to Question 10c, i.e. 
we divide units in two groups depending on whether profits/ability to pay is a 
common or less common ingredient in the local wage bargain. Our second 
proxy variable utilizes the full variation in the original answers. It should be 
noted that both proxy-variables are significantly correlated with the measure of 
earnings used in Table 5.
24  
Our econometric analysis of the determinants of rent sharing is shown in 
Table 14. Of the three variables that we expected to be correlated with rent 
sharing, LOGSIZE is positive and significant at the one percent level in all 
specifications. The coefficients on UNIONDENSITY and PERMCONTRACT 
have the expected positive sign, but the standard errors are large. Though UN-
IONDENSITY is not significant in any specification, PERMCONTRACT is 
significant at the five percent level in columns 3–4. We also identify a highly 
significant gender effect, to which we return in Section 8 below: respondents in 
firms with a large share of female employees are less prone to indicate that rent 






                                                       
24 The Spearman correlation between our first proxy and LOGEARNING is .215, and the corre-
lation between the second proxy and LOGEARNING is .264. The significant (partial) correla-
tions remain as we bring in sectoral and geographical controls in OLS earnings-equations (i.e. the 
kind of regressions that we report in Table 5). However, adding LOGSIZE (a variable that we for 
a priori reasons thought of as an indicator of bargaining strength) and other variables according 
to Table 5 to the estimating equation is enough to drastically alter the point estimates of the 
coefficients on both proxy-variables. At the same time their significance levels drop 
substantially. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   42
























































Industry dummies  Table 4  Two-digit  Table 4  Two-digit 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo R-squared  .127 .136 .087 .097 
No. of obs.  817 817 817 817 
No. of dependent 
variable=1 
281 281  --  -- 
Notes: The dependent variables were constructed from the answers to Questions 10c. In columns 
1–2 the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. In columns 3–4 the estimation method is 
maximum likelihood ordered logit (five response categories). Standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent 
level.  
 
We asked respondents to assess the empirical relevance of one particular 
bargaining model, the labor turnover version of the insider-outsider model (see 
e.g. Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). We presented the model in the following 
way:  
 
One theory to explain why wages may end up above the level that 
gives full employment is based on the notion that hirings and fir-
ings are costly to firms. These costs (for interviews, advertise-
ments, training, redundancy payment, etc.) make firms eager to 
keep already employed workers. By pushing up wages, this situa-
tion is exploited by employees. (Question 12b.) IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  43
Compared with Keynes's explanation of wage rigidity (discussed shortly) the 
insider-outsider model received a low score. Though our questions on job pro-
tection indicate (see below) that many managers believe that costs of hirings 
and firings are nontrivial, only 14 percent of our respondents indicated that the 
model coincided “completely” or “to a great extent” with their own experience. 
Fifty-two percent even dismissed the insider-outsider model as having little or 
no resemblance with their own experience.
25  
Summing up, except for managers in the public sector and unskilled ser-
vices many respondents indicated that the wage claims of their employees are 
responsive to profits and ability to pay. This finding is consistent with a main 
implication of a large class of bargaining models of unemployment and wage 
rigidity, but it is at odds with the competitive model.
26 Another finding is that 
our indicators of rent sharing and worker bargaining strength are robustly cor-
related with firm size.  
 
5.7  Workers' wage norms and Keynes’s explanation 
A classic explanation of wage rigidity is the argument of Keynes (1936, p. 14) 
that workers care about relative wages. Because of this they oppose money 
wage cuts, unless wages can be cut in a coordinated manner throughout the 
economy. If such inter-personal wage comparisons are to explain more than a 
trivial amount of wage rigidity, they should extend beyond workers in the same 
firm. Surveys among U.S. managers suggest however that employees mainly 
pay attention to the internal wage structure. Campbell and Kamlani (1997, p. 
780) conclude that workers’ notion of fair pay depend on own past wages, 
firm’s profits, and wages of other workers in the same firm. Bewley (1998, p. 
485) argues that Keynes’s relative wage theory is off the mark, since workers 
in the firms he approached had ”…little systematic knowledge of pay rates at 
other firms”.  
                                                       
25 Our econometric analysis, not shown, indicates that respondents in small units, and in units 
with a highly educated workforce, had a more positive appreciation of the insider-outsider 
model. Since fixed hiring and firing costs ought to be of greater concern for small units, and 
since it is more costly to recruit and train educated workers than uneducated ones, these partial 
correlations are what one would expect. 
26 Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) find that rent sharing and insider forces are weak in Swedish 
wage setting. They focus, however, on a period (1965–85) characterized by nationwide pay set-
ting. The aforementioned microeconometric study of Arai (2001) shows, in line with our find-
ings, that rent sharing is an important factor.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   44
In sharp contrast to this evidence, most of our respondents indicated that 
both internal and external wages were important norms of comparisons in the 
local wage bargain (Question 10a–b). Across all strata, 47.3 percent indicated 
that internal wage comparisons “always” or “frequently” played an important 
role, and 41.8 percent said the same about external wages. This result agrees 
with Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002), who report that managers in their sam-
ple of large manufacturing firms believed that their employees cared both about 
internal and external wages.  
What can explain the greater role of inter-firm wage comparisons in Swed-
ish field surveys? Agell and Lundborg (2002) conjecture that unions play a 
role, because they can be expected to disseminate information about pay and 
pay scales across firms, and across industries. Bewley (1998, p. 485) describes 
his non-union firm as “isolated islands”, where workers know little about ex-
ternal pay. Interestingly, he also observes that the precision of the information 
about external pay appears to be higher among workers in unionized firms. 
Table 15, columns 1–4, shows our econometric analysis of the determinants 
of workers’ wage norms. The most persistent finding is indeed that 
UNIONDENSITY is positively and significantly correlated with the intensity 
of both internal and external wage comparisons in the local wage bargain. 
Stepwise regressions (not shown) show that the coefficients on 
UNIONDENSITY remain significant as we change the set of conditioning 
variables. The coefficient on UNIVERSITY is positive and significant at the 
five percent level in columns 3 and 4, which suggests that external wages play 
a greater role in units with a large share of highly educated employees. This 
result agrees with Andrews and Henry (1963), who report that interest in 
external pay increases with the job level, and with Agell and Lundborg (1995), 
who report that senior white-collar workers pay greater attention to external 
wages. Among other results, it can be noted that internal wages appear to play a 
more important role in larger organizations (the coefficient on LOGSIZE is 
significant at the one percent level in columns 1 and 2), and that external wages 
appear to play a lesser role in units with a large share of female employees (the 
coefficient on FEMALE is significant at the one percent level in columns 3 and 
4). Finally, the coefficient on PUBLIC is positive and highly significant inIFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  45
Table 15. Logit analysis of determinants of workers’ wage norms  
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable  
 Internal  wage 






















































































Industry dummies  Table 4  Two-digit  Table 4  Two-digit  Table 4  Two-digit 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.144  0.150  .082 .091 .017 .018 
No.  of  obs.  819 819 819 819 797 797 
No. of dependent  varable=1  388  388  347  347  387  387 
Notes: The dependent variables were constructed from the answers to Question 10a–b, and Question 12a. In all columns the estimation method is 
maximum likelihood logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one 
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column 1, which indicates that public employees pay greater attention to inter-
nal wages than those in manufacturing.
27  
 
We obtained additional indications that Keynes’s explanation of wage rigid-
ity holds more promise for unionized economies when we asked respondents to 
assess how well the following coincided with their own experience:  
 
Some researchers argue that the reason why wages seldom fall is 
that wage relativities might be altered. Employees try to protect 
their position in the wage hierarchy, and they resist wage cuts be-
cause they are afraid that they will fall behind other employees, at 
their own or other units. (Question 12a.) 
 
Among our respondents 48.5 percent indicated that this mechanism coincided 
“completely” or “to a great extent” with their own experience. Table 15, col-
umns 5–6, shows that there is a significant partial correlation between UN-
IONDENSITY and respondents’ appreciation of Keynes’s theory. 
 
5.8  On the complementarity between mechanisms of wage 
rigidity 
Theoretical models of wage rigidity typically deal with one complication at a 
time, and different theories are often treated as alternatives to each other. Un-
ions and workers’ concern over relative wages are often treated as independent 
sources of wage rigidity. Similarly, a large (primarily European) literature has 
emphasized the role of worker-firm bargaining over wages (which may occur 
in union as well as non-union settings), while an equally imposing (primarily 
US) literature has emphasized the role of efficiency wage mechanisms.  
As noted by Summers (1988), it is probably more fruitful to view these 
theories as complementary and mutually reinforcing explanations for wage ri-
gidity. Summers argues that considerations of relative wages and efficiency 
wages magnify greatly the effects of worker/union bargaining power. First, in 
an “...efficiency wage environment, firms that are forced to pay their workers 
premium wages suffer only second-order losses. In almost any plausible bar-
gaining framework, this makes it easier for workers to extract concessions” 
                                                       
27 This result is consistent with the observation that public disclosure legislation in Sweden 
makes it easy for public employees to acquire information about the pay of their co-workers.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  47
(Summers (1988, p. 386)). Second, he notes that whenever workers’ care about 
external pay, the presence of insider bargaining power in some sector will have 
spillover effects on wages in other sectors.  
Many of our findings appear to corroborate Summer’s conjecture about the 
complementary nature of theories of wage rigidity. We have reported evidence 
that unions increase awareness about wage relativities. Moreover, establish-
ment size is strongly correlated with indicators of bargaining strength and with 
indicators of effort and reciprocity, a coincidence that suggests that the mecha-
nisms of efficiency wages and bargaining may interact. 
To further explore the possible interactions between mechanisms of wage 
rigidity we computed the Spearman rank correlations between the replies to all 
our questions that relate to effort and relative wages on the one hand, and those 
that relate to bargaining and rent sharing on the other. There were five response 
options to these questions, and before computing the Spearman correlations we 
coded the responses on an integer scale 1–5, with 1 indicating that the mecha-
nism in question was an important one, and 5 that the mechanism was unimpor-
tant. The results are shown in Table 16. The estimated correlations are all posi-
tive, and – with one exception – statistically significant. On average, those re-
spondents who indicate that mechanisms of bargaining and rent sharing play a 
relatively important role in the local wage bargain are also the ones who attrib-
ute a relatively important role to efficiency wages and wage relativities. 
 
5.9 Money  illusion 
A classic way of explaining wage rigidity is with reference to money illusion, 
which is often taken to mean that agents for some reason have preferences de-
fined over nominal rather than real outcomes. The surveys of popular attitudes 
of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) and Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky 
(1997) suggest that money illusion is an important phenomenon. Similarly, 
Bewley (1999) observes that many managers were convinced that their em-
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Table 16. Spearman rank correlations between strength of bargaining mechanisms and importance of relative 
wages/efficiency wages 
 
Questions on bargaining  
mechanisms 
 

































seek other jobs 
(Question 11b) 
 

















































Notes: In computing the correlation coefficients we used the non-dichotomized versions of the response variable. The numbers within parenthesis 
show the p-value for rejection of the null that the variables in question are uncorrelated 
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We asked our wage setters to react to the following scenarios, adapted
28 from 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 731):  
 
Scenario 1 (872 respondents). Assume hypothetically that your en-
terprise is making a small surplus. There is no inflation, and unem-
ployment is high. There are many job seekers applying for a job at 
your unit. Under these circumstances you decide to propose a pay 
cut of 5%. How do you think that your employees would find this 
proposal? (Question 13a.) 
 
  Acceptable  5.7 %     Not acceptable      94.3 % 
 
Scenario 2 (861 respondents). Assume hypothetically that your en-
terprise is making a small surplus. Inflation is 10% percent, and 
unemployment is high. There are many job seekers applying for a 
job at your unit. Under these circumstances you decide to propose 
a pay increase of only 5%. How do you think that your employees 
would find this proposal? (Question 13b.) 
 
  Acceptable  49.6 %    Not acceptable      50.4 % 
 
Although both scenarios have identical real implications, many managers 
responded that their employees would find it easier to accept a reduction in real 
wages that occurs through inflation, than through a nominal pay cut. These re-
sults are strikingly similar to those reported by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
(1986). In their telephone survey of randomly selected residents of Toronto and 
Vancouver, 62 percent indicated that it was “unfair” to cut nominal pay under 
the circumstances of scenario 1, while only 22 percent thought the same about 
the five percent pay rise in scenario 2. Judging from these responses 40 percent 
                                                       
28 In the original scenarios of Kahneman et al., the firm cuts pay under scenario 1, and increases 
wages by less than inflation under scenario 2. Since unilateral wage cuts are not permitted in 
Sweden, we chose a somewhat different phrasing. Thus, our firm proposes a certain wage 
change, and we then simply asked the respondent to assess “...how your employees would find 
this proposal”. Our respondents were asked to rate their employees’ reactions to the two scenar-
ios according to the following five alternatives: entirely unacceptable, highly unacceptable, 
hardly acceptable, acceptable subject to qualifications, and acceptable. To arrive at the results of 
the main text, we aggregated the three former under “not acceptable”, and the two latter under 
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(62-22) of the respondents of Kahneman et al. (1986) were subject to money il-
lusion, while 43.9 percent (94.3-50.4) of our respondents indicated the same. 
It was probably difficult for our managers to come up with well-founded an-
swers to our hypothetical scenarios. Yet, we find it interesting that our profes-
sional wage negotiators seem to be as convinced that money illusion is an im-
portant phenomenon in the labor market as the student- and laymen-
populations that participate in surveys and laboratory experiments. Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky (1997) report a range of survey evidence with a bearing 
on money illusion. Their data was gathered from survey questions asked to 
people in shopping malls and an airport. They also report evidence from sur-
veys of undergraduate students at Princeton University. Fehr and Tyran (2001) 
report interesting experimental results on money illusion; subjects were under-
graduates at the University of Zurich.  
 
 
6  Unemployment stigma, job security 
and hiring costs 
So far we have dealt with questions of an immediate relevance for students of 
wage rigidity. But our survey also includes questions that are less directly re-
lated to wage rigidity. In this and subsequent sections, we summarize this evi-
dence, which deals with various issues in the economics of personnel.  
 
6.1  Is there a stigma from long-term unemployment? 
It is a common argument that firms view unemployed job seekers as less pro-
ductive. Such a stigma may arise for a number of reasons. The skills of the un-
employed can be expected to deteriorate over time, firms may suspect that un-
employed workers are “lemons” that have been discarded by other firms, etc. 
These mechanisms may generate unemployment persistence in the wake of a 
macroeconomic shock; see Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and Eriksson and 
Gottfries (2000). To examine whether there is a negative reputation effect from 
unemployment, we asked:  
 
How long time must a person have been unemployed before you 
consider him/her to be less suitable for a job, in spite of the fact IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  51
that the person in other respects appears to satisfy all requirements? 
(Question 14a.) 
 
While 37.5 percent of our respondents indicated that unemployment was of no 
concern, 62.5 percent indicated that there was a negative reputation effect from 
unemployment spells of varying lengths. We conclude that unemployment 
stigma is a significant phenomenon. Bewley (1999, chapter 15) reaches a 
somewhat different conclusion. Though some of his managers indicated that 
unemployment was a bad sign, the dominant view appears to have been that 
unemployment was an unimportant consideration. Below, we will analyze to 
what extent strict job protection in Sweden can explain why the bias against the 
(long-term) unemployed appears to be more severe in our survey.
29 
Labor market training was a main strategy for combating unemployment 
during the Swedish crisis of the 1990s. It is not obvious how training affects 
the stigma from unemployment. If employers expect that training programs up-
grade the skills of participants, there will be a weaker stigma. If employers ex-
pect that low-ability workers get systematically sorted into these programs, 
there will be a greater stigma. To compare the possible reputation effects from 
participation in training with the reputation effects from unemployment, we 
asked: 
 
Assume that a person has alternated between unemployment and par-
ticipation in a training program for some time. How long time must 
the person have been in this situation before you consider him/her to 
be less suitable for a job, in spite of the fact that the person in other re-
spects appears to satisfy all requirements? (Question 14b.)  
 
                                                       
29 Which explanatory variables are correlated with the stigma from unemployment? We con-
ducted our standard logit analysis (not shown), but found few significant correlations. We found 
no support for the idea that the stigma from unemployment ought to increase with the skill level 
of the workplace (the coefficient on UNIVERSITY is not statistically significant in our specifica-
tions). In a survey of British managers, Meager and Metcalf (1987) conclude that the bias against 
the long-term unemployed increases with the skill level of the job to be filled. The only near-
robust finding is that managers with a large share of foreign employees are less likely to bother 
about the unemployment record of job applicants.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   52
The responses suggest that participation in a training program tends to mitigate 
the stigma from unemployment.
30 Figure 2 merges the responses to Questions 
14a–b. Comparing the distributions, the one showing the response to Question 
14b has more mass to the right, which suggests that training tends to prolong 
the time required for the stigma from unemployment to develop. A formal sta-
tistical test gives the same message. Of the 866 respondents who replied to both 
Question 14a and Question 14b, 40 indicated that there was less stigma from 
regular unemployment than from unemployment/training, 232 that there was 
less stigma from unemployment/training, and 594 that the states conveyed the 
same stigma. To obtain a p-value for this outcome, consider a binomial distri-
bution with  5 . = p  and  272 = N ; i.e. a distribution with the same probability 
that a respondent picks either of two alternatives. Our 40 “yeas” and 232 
“nays” have been drawn from this distribution with  0001 . < −value p . 
 























Figure 2. “How long spell (in months) of unemployment, or training/unemployment, is 
required before you consider a job applicant as less suitable?” (866 respondents) 
                                                       
30 The written comments of some respondents suggest that our questions on the stigma from un-
employment/training were phrased in too general terms. One respondent indicated that the un-
employment history of a job applicant must be judged against the unemployment situation in the 
region of residence of the job applicant. A couple of other respondents indicated that any nega-
tive signaling effects from labor market training depend crucially on the type of training pro-
gram. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  53
6.2  Job security and hiring costs 
Several authors have studied how job protection affects firms’ decisions on hir-
ings and firings, and the implications for aggregate unemployment dynamics.
31 
Our survey included questions that tried to shed light on these arguments. Be-
cause we have a lot of information about worker-firm characteristics, we were 
curious to see whether we could identify factors that weakened or strengthened 
the link between job protection and firms’ hiring decisions. We asked how job 
security affected the screening of job applicants (Question 4a). A majority (54 
percent) indicated that job protection to a “very great” or “fairly great” extent 
boosted their screening effort. This clear-cut response appears to vindicate the 
assumption of the theoretical models that legal obstacles to firings increase the 
costs of hirings.  
To avoid the commitments associated with a permanent employment con-
tract, firms face an incentive to adjust to a business upturn by overtime work 
rather than by new hirings. This is also one of the mechanisms that may gener-
ate unemployment persistence after an adverse macroeconomic shock, see e.g. 
Bertola (1999). Other ways of avoiding the commitment of a permanent con-
tract is to exploit the flexible arrangements that are permitted by law (trial em-
ployment and hirings from temporary work agencies). When asked about these 
mechanisms (Questions 4b and 4c), 38 percent of all managers indicated that 
job protection to a “very great” or “fairly great” extent boosted their use of 
overtime work (at the expense of new hirings), and 32.8 percent indicated that 
job protection gave the same boost to their use of temporary contracts.  
Table 17 shows our analysis of how job protection affects managers' choice 
between new hirings and overtime during a business upturn. The coefficient on 
LOGSIZE is negative and significant in all columns, indicating that job protec-
tion has a more adverse impact on hirings in smaller units. One way of rational-
izing this robust correlation is by noting that fixed hiring and firing costs cre-
                                                       
31 See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990). For a recent overview of the literature, 
see Bertola (1999). For aggregate evidence on the effects of job protection on unemployment dy-
namics, see Blanchard and Wolfers (1999). Swedish job security provides employees with far 
reaching protection against unfair dismissal, advance notice when laid off, layoffs according to a 
strict seniority principle, and severance pay. The only legal grounds for dismissal are redundan-
cies and severe personal misconduct. Turning out to have a lower ability than the firm expected 
at the time of hiring is no legal ground for firing an employee. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   54
ated by job protection ought to be of greater concern for smaller units.
32 Fur-
thermore, the coefficient on PUBLIC is negative in columns 1 and 3 (with t-
ratios of about 5 and 6). It appears that job protection is less of a hindrance to 
new hires among public sector units.  
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Industry dummies  Table 4  Two-digit  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  .089 .097 .057 
No. of obs.  812  812  812 
No. of dependent  
variable=1 
315 315  -- 
Notes: The dependent variable is constructed from the answers to Question 4b. In columns 1–2 
the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. In column 3 the estimation method is maxi-
mum likelihood ordered logit (four response categories). Standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent level.  
 
6.3  Job security and the stigma from long-term unemploy-
ment 
Kugler and Saint-Paul (2000) argue that long-term unemployment is associated 
with a more severe stigma in an environment where job protection is strict. 
Since job protection can be expected to make firms more sensitive to the risk of 
                                                       
32 It is of some interest to note that we also found that respondents in small units had a signifi-
cantly more positive appreciation of the labor turnover version of the insider-outsider model; see 
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hiring a “lemon”, and since long-term unemployment can be interpreted as a 
signal of low-productivity, job protection gives firms an incentive to hire em-
ployed job seekers instead of unemployed ones.  
As a simple test of this explanation we computed the correlations between 
our questions on job security (Questions 4a–c) and those on the stigma from 
long term unemployment/training (Questions 14a–b). The responses to Ques-
tions 4a–c were given on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating that job protec-
tion was an unimportant consideration. We coded the responses to Questions 
14a–b on an ordinal scale from 1 to 6, with 6 indicating the weakest form of 
stigma. The Spearman rank correlations between the responses are shown in 
Table 18. All rank correlations are positive and highly significant. In line with 
the theoretical prediction, managers who indicate that job protection is an im-
portant consideration are also the ones who are the most likely to view long 
term unemployment as a negative factor in the recruitment process.  
 
Table 18. Spearman rank correlations between perceived strictness of job pro-
tection and perceived stigma from long-term unemployment 
Questions on stigma 
from long-term  
unemployment or 
 
Questions on the importance of job protection 
 






Job protection boosts 
temporary contracts 
(Question 4c) 
























Notes: In computing the correlation coefficients we used the non-dichotomized versions of the 
response variables, see main text for further details. The numbers within parenthesis show the 
p-value for rejection of the null that the variables in question are uncorrelated. 
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7 Motivation 
7.1  How to motivate 
What tools do firms use to motivate their employees? We asked respondents to 
indicate to what extent they relied on the following (see Questions 9a–9d): (i) 
supervision and monitoring, (ii) career ladders, (iii) performance-related pay, 
and (iv) measures to promote good management-worker relations. In asking 
about the latter we provided examples of the techniques that according to man-
agement texts could be used to stimulate good management-worker relations, 
like making the job interesting, delegating authority and communicating the 
goals of the firm.  
There is an obvious risk that respondents’ choice between “good manage-
ment-worker relations” and e.g. “supervision and monitoring” is biased by a 
framing effect; after all, “good relations” sounds so much nicer than monitor-
ing! Even so, we find it noteworthy that such a large majority ranked good rela-
tions as a more important motivational tool than all the standard tools discussed 
in the economics literature, see Table 19. For example, in all sectors 63.9 per-
cent indicated that they relied on good management-worker relations to a great 
or fairly great extent, while only 15 percent indicated the same about supervi-
sion and monitoring.
33 Respondents in unskilled service units relied on supervi-
sion and monitoring to a greater extent. Still, only 27.9 percent of the respon-
dents in this sector indicated that supervision and monitoring was used to a 
great or fairly great extent, while almost 70 percent indicated the same about 
good relations. Respondents in skilled services pointed to the importance of ca-
reer ladders, a device that plays a key role in theories of tournaments and work-







                                                       
33 Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002), Bewley (1999) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) are other 
studies reporting that human resource managers often deny the relevance of the motivational 
tools assumed in the canonical shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  
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Table 19. Importance of different motivational tools in different sectors 
Percentage of respondents that use the motivational tool to a 








Supervision and  












worker relations  58.2 69.8 68.1
 
63.1 
Notes: The numbers are calculated from the replies to Questions 9a–d.   
 
Table 20 shows our analysis of the determinants of firms’ choice of motiva-
tional technique. In column 1 the coefficient on UNIVERSITY is significant at 
the one percent level, which suggests that units with a highly educated work-
force are significantly less prone to use “supervision and monitoring”. In col-
umns 2, 3 and 4 the coefficients on BASICSCHOOL are negative and signifi-
cant (but only at the ten percent level in column 2). It thus appears that units 
with a lowly educated workforce make less intensive use of (i) career tracks, 
(ii) performance-related pay, and (iii) measures to promote good relations. 
There is also a highly significant size effect; the willingness to use career lad-
ders and performance related pay increases with LOGSIZE. The coefficients on 
PUBLIC are negatively significant in columns 2 and 3, suggesting that public 
units pay less attention to explicit incentive mechanisms. Finally, the willing-
ness to design career ladders decreases with FEMALE, and increases with 
MULTIUNIT. Of the results not shown, the most interesting one is that the co-
efficient on UNIONDENSITY is not statistically significant in any of the re-
gressions. Thus, we find no evidence that firms with a large union presence 
find it more difficult to monitor work effort, and to use career ladders and per-
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Industry controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Other controls  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4  Table 4 
Pseudo  R-squared  .038 .108 .074 .032 
No.  of  obs.  823 821 820 820 
No. of dependent  
variable=1  
431 541 393 525 
Notes: The dependent variable is constructed from the answers to Questions 9a–d. In all columns 
the estimation method is maximum likelihood logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent level.  
 
To examine in more detail firm’s choice of motivational technique we com-
puted the Spearman rank correlations between the answers to Questions 9a–d. 
The most noteworthy finding was that there appears to be a positive association 
between firms’ use of explicit pecuniary incentives on the one hand, and the 
use of soft incentives (promotion of good relations) on the other. The Spearman 
correlation between the answers to questions 9b (career tracks) and 9d (good 
relations) was 0.30, and the correlation between 9c (performance-related pay) IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  59
and 9d was 0.14 ( 0001 . < −value p  for both correlations). One way of think-
ing about these correlations is with reference to recent experimental results 
suggesting that monetary reward schemes tend to crowd out voluntary coopera-
tion and “intrinsic motivation”, see Fehr and Gächter (2002) and the references 
cited therein. To the extent that explicit incentives have a negative side effect 
on intrinsic motivation, firms that rely on explicit incentives to a great extent 
may have much to gain from also making extensive use of soft incentives that 
make employees more loyal to the firm.  
 
7.2  Is competition good for productivity? 
Is competition among employees good or bad for productivity? Economic the-
ory offers no clear guidance. Tournament theory predicts that competition for 
wages and career slots encourages work effort, see Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
But there are also models suggesting that competition discourages cooperation, 
and provides workers with incentives to sabotage the effort of their coworkers, 
see Lazear (1989). We briefly described these possibilities, and then asked the 
following:  
 
In your opinion, how does (or would) keen competition between 
employees affect work motivation at your workplace? (Ques-
tion 7.) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, respondents were sharply divided on the net 
benefits from keen competition between workers, with 37 percent responding 
that competition was largely detrimental, 44.8 percent that it was largely bene-
ficial, and the remaining 18.2 percent indicating that the costs about balanced 
the benefits. In a follow-up question we asked whether large wage differentials 
were beneficial or detrimental for work motivation. Again, we obtained a bi-
modal response distribution: 36.1 percent thought that large wage differentials 
were detrimental, 50.9 percent that they were beneficial and 13 percent that the 
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Figure 3. ”In your opinion, how does (or would) keen competition between employees 
affect work motivation at your workplace?” (875 respondents) 
 
To analyze the determinants of respondents’ attitude towards competition 
and wage differentials, we proceeded as follows. There were five response op-
tions to Questions 7 and 8, and we coded them as 1, 2, 3, etc. We then esti-
mated a set of ordered logit models, where we used our benchmark regressors 
from Table 4. These regressions indicate that many of the variables that we a 
priori thought to be of importance for managers’ assessment of the motiva-
tional pros and cons of competition/wage differentials had no explanatory 
power. Thus, neither of sectoral affiliation, union density and educational char-
acteristics played a significant role.  
However, one regressor did turn out as we expected. In the previous section 
we showed that larger firms make more frequent use of explicit incentives, and 
in Table 21 we show that size also appears to be positively correlated with 
managers’ attitudes to competition/wage differentials. Row 1 shows that there 
is a positive Spearman correlation between LOGSIZE and managers’ apprecia-
tion of the benefits from competition, and between LOGSIZE and the apprecia-
tion of the benefits from large wage differentials. Though the former correla-
tion is small, the latter is large and highly significant. Rows 2–4 show the esti-
mated coefficient on LOGSIZE in our multivariate regressions. The correlation 
between LOGSIZE and respondents’ appreciation of the benefits from large 
wage differentials is positive and highly significant, and it survives changes in IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  61
the set of conditioning variables (rows 3 and 4). Our evidence on the correla-
tion between LOGSIZE and respondents’ appreciation of the benefits from 
competition is weaker. In rows 2 and 4 LOGSIZE is significant at the ten per-
cent level. But in our stepwise regression in row 3 LOGSIZE does not belong 
in the final set of explanatory variables.  
 
Table 21. The influence of LOGSIZE on attitudes towards competition/large 
wage differentials: ordered logit analysis 




 Is  competition 
good for work 
motivation? 
Are wage differ-
entials good for 
work motivation? 









3. Ordered logit,  
stepwise backward 




4. Ordered logit  Two-digit industry-
dummies, other controls 





Notes: The dependent variables were constructed from the replies to Questions 7 and 8. In coding 
the replies to these questions, we used the following categories: 1=only negative,...,5=only posi-
tive. In rows 2–4 the estimation method is maximum likelihood ordered logit. The table shows 
parameter estimates for the coefficient on LOGSIZE, with standard errors in parentheses. * de-
notes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent level. In model 
3 all variables not significant at the five percent level were eliminated according to a stepwise 
procedure ( -- means that LOGSIZE did not survive this procedure). 
 
One way of interpreting this evidence is with reference to Lazear (1989), 
who shows that the benefits from creating a competitive work environment – 
where relative rewards play an important role – depend on firms’ ability to 
match workers with appropriate personalities. To the extent that it is easier to 
create such matches in a large organization, respondents in large firms ought to 
have a more positive attitude towards competition, and towards incentive 
schemes based on relative wages. In the related model of Priks (2002) effort-
based pay provides employees with an incentive to increase output, but it also 
provides employees with an incentive to engage in costly rent-seeking within IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   62
the firm. Under certain assumptions the former effect will dominate the latter 
one for large firms, while the opposite will be true for small firms. In equilib-
rium we would then expect to see effort-based pay in large firms, and egalitar-
ian pay schemes in small firms.  
 
 
8  Gender and models of work and pay 
A large literature analyzes gender differentials in the labor market; see Altonji 
and Blank (1999) for an overview. Though our survey was not primarily in-
tended as a contribution to this literature, our econometric analysis has revealed 
certain regularities that we have not seen documented in previous survey-
research. This section explores the robustness of these findings.  
Table 22 reports our sensitivity analysis. In Section 5.3 (Table 9) we noted 
that firms with a large share of female employees were less likely to believe 
that employees who were unhappy with their pay would reciprocate by reduc-
ing effort, and column 1 examines the robustness of this finding. Row 1 repro-
duces the highly significant coefficient on FEMALE from Table 9. In row 2 we 
show that the univariate Spearman correlation between FEMALE and the re-
sponse variable is in fact small, and not significantly different from zero. Some 
exploration shows that this result is entirely due to the omission of industry 
dummies. Because the share of female workers differs systematically between 
sectors (see Table 3), the univariate correlation coefficient picks up all con-
founding influences due to omitted sector-specific effects. In row 3 we see that 
the coefficient on FEMALE becomes highly significant as we reintroduce con-
trols for sectoral affiliation at the two-digit level. In row 4 we show that FE-
MALE drops out of the final specification of our stepwise regression. This is 
due to the fact that the controls for industrial affiliation were not jointly signifi-
cant at the five percent level and thus excluded. However, if we instead exclude 
variables not significant at the ten percent level FEMALE would be in the final 
model with p-value=0.001. Finally, rows 5 and 6 show that the coefficient on 
FEMALE remains significant at the one percent level as we estimate ordered 
logit models, which exploit the full variation in our data. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  63
Table 22. The influence of FEMALE: stability analysis 
Model estimated  Other explanatory variables 
except FEMALE 
Dependent variable  





play important role 




















2. Univariate, Spearman correlation  --  -.015  -.102**  -.236**  -.078* 
3. Logit  Two-digit industry-dummies, 









4. Logit, stepwise backward 
 






5. Ordered logit 
 








6. Ordered logit 
 
Two-digit industry-dummies, 









Notes: The dependent variables were constructed from Questions 9b, 10b, 10c and 11a. The table shows the estimates of the coefficient on FE-
MALE (standard errors in parentheses). * denotes significance at the five percent level, and ** significance at the one percent level. In Models 1–4 
the dependent variables are defined as (1=yes, 0=no). In model 4 all variables not significant at the five percent level were eliminated according to 
a stepwise procedure (the table shows the coefficient on FEMALE in the final specification, which only includes significant variables). In column 
1 FEMALE was not included in final model, since controls for industrial affiliation were not significant and thus excluded. However, if instead 
variables not significant at the ten percent level were excluded, FEMALE would be in the final model with p-value=0.01. In models 5–6 the de-
pendent variables are given as the ordinal response to the relevant questions.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   64
In tables 14 and 15 we showed that both profits/ability to pay and external 
wage relativities appeared to play a lesser role in the local wage bargain in 
units with a large share of female employees. Columns 2 and 3 show that these 
results survive all our sensitivity tests. Finally, column 4 examines how gender 
affects firms' willingness to design career ladders. The coefficient on FEMALE 
is negative and significant in all specifications where we use the industry 
dummies of Table 4. In the specifications with two-digit dummies the coeffi-
cient remains negative, but it is not significant at conventional levels.  
In our sample firms with a large share of female employees have lower 
earnings, an effect which survives even as we introduce a range of controls for 
sectoral affiliation and worker-firm characteristics, see Table 5. The regulari-
ties that we have documented in this section suggest that part of the reason may 
derive from innate psychological and sociological differences between men and 
women. Taken at face value the results of Table 22 seem to imply that:  
(i).  Women are less aggressive wage bargainers, caring less about ex-
ternal wages and profits/ability to pay. Alternatively, we may think 
of women as having a weaker position in the local wage bargain.  
(ii).  Women feel greater loyalty to their employer, in the sense that they 
are less prone to counter a perceived wage inequity with a retalia-
tory effort reduction.  
(iii).  Firms perceive a lesser need to create explicit incentive schemes 
(like career ladders) in a work-environment dominated by female 
employees.  
The speculative nature of these conclusions need not be emphasized.
34 In the 
future we believe that specially designed surveys could be used to sort out 
whether men and women have different attitudes towards monetary incentives, 
reciprocity, etc. One way of testing for such gender effects would be to send 
out the same questionnaire (containing identical questions about motivation, 
reciprocity, wage norms, etc) to a sample of men and women holding similar 
jobs at the same firm.  
 
 
                                                       
34 To the best of our knowledge, no other survey has explored the role of gender in shaping atti-
tudes towards incentives and motivation. Recent experimental studies indicating that men and 
women exhibit different degrees of “selfishness” or “generosity” include e.g. Eckel and 
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9 Concluding  remarks 
Can a student of wage rigidity and wage policy learn anything useful by asking 
questions to those in charge of wage bargaining and personnel relations? In re-
cent years some economists have answered this question in the affirmative. 
This paper is a contribution to this literature. Unlike previous studies, we use a 
randomized sampling design, which provides us with a representative coverage 
of firms in different sectors, and in different size categories, including 300 units 
with less than 20 employees. Because we have detailed information about 
worker-firm characteristics, we can probe deeper than the preceding literature 
in identifying behavioral regularities.  
We believe that the following concluding observations are in order. First, 
from the point of view of macroeconomic research on wage rigidity our most 
important finding is probably that we corroborate the results from previous, 
less representative surveys. Real world managers appear to believe that their 
workers are subject to money illusion, that work morale matters for perform-
ance, and that employees who feel dissatisfied with their pay normally reduce 
effort. Moreover, these findings are in more or less complete agreement with 
recent evidence from experimental labor markets. As noted by Howitt (2002) in 
his review of Bewley (1999), many of these insights from surveys and experi-
ments can be explained along the lines of reciprocity-theory, developed by e.g. 
Rabin (1993) and others.  
Second, we have analyzed how wage policy and wage rigidity differ be-
tween segments of the labor market. Our most consistent finding is probably 
that an astonishing number of mechanisms appear to differ significantly be-
tween large and small organizations. Small organizations rely less on pecuniary 
incentives, and managers in these firms appear to have a more hostile attitude 
towards incentive schemes based on competition and relative wages. Larger 
organizations appear to be more vulnerable to the mechanisms of efficiency 
wages, and managers in large organizations appear to have more reason to fear 
that poor work morale impacts badly on work performance.  
Third, we have reported evidence that mechanisms of wage rigidity tend to 
complement each other, a possibility that is rarely acknowledged in models of 
wage rigidity. As noted by Summers (1988), models that simultaneously allow 
for e.g. bargaining and efficiency wages/relative wages generate more persis-
tent rigidity than models that deal with one complication at a time. We are not 
aware of any other study that has empirically documented these interactions.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   66
Fourth, we have shown that despite several years of very low inflation and 
high unemployment the incidence of nominal wage cuts in Sweden has been 
exceptionally low. In this context, it should be noted that previous mac-
roeconometric research, based on data from the 1970s and 1980s, has indicated 
that Swedish real wages are in fact quite responsive to the unemployment 
level, see Calmfors and Forslund (1990) and Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991). However, these aggregate econometric studies rely on data from dec-
ades of high inflation, when adjustments of real wages could occur simply by 
letting wage inflation fall behind price inflation.
35 The findings of this paper are 
certainly consistent with the view, often attributed to Tobin (1972), that the ri-
gidity of real wages can be expected to increase significantly as inflation falls 
to zero.  
Though we believe that our statistical design represents a considerable im-
provement over the important preceding literature, a final disclaimer is in or-
der. Since there are a limited number of questions that can be added to a single 
survey we focus on a fairly narrow range of issues. We emphasize mechanisms 
of wage rigidity that operate at the local level, and we have more questions 
about endogenous sources of wage rigidity than about legal institutions. Sur-
veys that specifically deal with e.g. legal institutions seem like a useful com-
plement to the present study. However, to fully explore the effects of country-
specific institutions it appears that a broader survey design is called for, like 
sending out the same questionnaire to firms in countries with different institu-
tions. 
                                                       
35 In a recent aggregate econometric study, Forslund and Kolm (2000) conclude that real wages 
in Sweden show little responsiveness to unemployment. Forslund and Kolm include data from 
the 1990s, when Swedish unemployment has been high, and inflation low. IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  67
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Appendix 1: Analysis of non-response 
bias 
To assess the magnitude of the potential non-response bias we studied how the 
replies of late responders (i.e. those returning the questionnaire after one or 
more reminders) related to the replies of those responding immediately. We 
compared the replies on questions 4a–14c of the questionnaire (26 questions in 
all) of the 282 late responders with the replies of the 603 immediate responders. 
According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of shift in location between two 
populations there were significant differences (p<0.05) in the replies to three 
out of 26 questions. Late responders were more inclined to choose an alterna-
tive indicating little acceptance of the statements in questions 4b and 12a, and 
to choose an alternative indicating a lesser stigma from long-term unemploy-
ment (question 14a).  
We next make the assumption that non-responders would have answered 
questions 4b, 12a and 14a in the same way as the late responders. More pre-
cisely, for each of our 12 strata we assumed that non-responders would have 
answered these questions in exactly the same way as did the late responders. 
By adding these hypothetical replies of the non-responders to the actual ones 
we can then obtain a predicted response distribution for the full sample. By 
comparing this predicted distribution with the actual one, we obtain an estimate 
of the potential non-response bias.  
When we perform this exercise for question 4b, (does protection reduce hir-
ings?) the percentage of respondents choosing alternatives (1, 2, 3, 4) changes 
from (15.9, 22.2, 33.5, 28.4) to (14.9, 23.0, 34.1, 28.0). For question 12a (does 
Keynes’s relative wage theory describe relevant mechanism?), the percentage 
of respondents choosing alternatives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) changes from (10.8, 37.7, 
28.3, 10.4, 12.8) to (10.2, 36.0, 28.9, 11.0, 13.9). Finally, for question 14a (how 
long spell of unemployment is required before there is a stigma from unem-
ployment?) the percentage of respondents choosing alternatives 1–6 changes 
from (37.5, 5.1, 16.5, 20.5, 5.1, 15.3) to (39.4, 5.2, 16.0, 20.4, 5.0, 14.0).  
Based on this standard method of analyzing non-response bias, we conclude 
that the potential bias is quite small in our survey. The small difference be-
tween hypothetical and actual responses reflects two circumstances. First, the 
responses of late responders do not differ much from those of the immediate 
responders. Second, the percentage of non-response (24.9%) in our survey is in 
fact quite low.  IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside  73
Appendix 2: Covering letter and ques-
tionnaire 
Survey about pay and unemployment 
 
The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) has asked Statistics 
Sweden to conduct a survey about pay setting and causes of unemployment. 
The questionnaire is distributed to a sample of 1200 firms/organizations with at 
least five employees. 
 
Purpose of the survey 
The purpose of the survey is to provide important information about how the 
process of pay determination affects unemployment. What are the reasons for 
wage rigidity? Is wage rigidity a cause of persistent unemployment? Does the 
institutions of wage setting prevent the unemployed from re-entering the labour 
market? These are some of the questions researchers want to learn more about. 
The survey also contains questions on the effects of legislation, wage bargain-
ing, personnel policy, etc.  
 
The questions 
The survey is primarily directed at central decision-makers in various types of 
firms and organizations. We would greatly appreciate your contribution to the 
research on the reasons for unemployment by responding to the survey. The 
greatest benefit will be derived if the human resource manager or someone with 
corresponding experience of personnel policy and pay bargaining answers the 
survey. To avoid burdening the survey with information that exists in other 
sources of statistics, the answers will be supplemented with information on re-




The answers to the survey will be treated confidentially and will solely be used 
for research purposes. When the investigation is complete, the material will be 
handed over to IFAU in a non-traceable format. All the information we gather 
is protected by the Official Confidentiality Act, Chapter 9, Paragraph 4. The 
survey design and questionnaire have been approved by the Board of Swedish IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   74
Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (Näringslivets nämnd för regel-
granskning). 
 
Questions about the survey 
Questions about the survey, or about the project, are answered by the project 
manager: Professor Jonas Agell, Department of Economics, Uppsala Univer-
sity, phone: +46 18 471 1104. You may also contact Agneta Sandqvist at Sta-
tistics Sweden, phone: +46 19 176027; e-mail: agneta.sandqvist@scb.se. 
 
Please answer the questions and return the survey to Statistics Sweden in the 





Jonas  Agell       Agneta  Sandqvist 
Professor       Head  of  Survey  Division 
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  1a  Have wages (regular hourly wage, monthly salary, piece wage, etc.)  
    been reduced at any time at your workplace during the crisis years  
    of the 1990s?  
 
   1  Yes 
      2  No   Go to question 2a 
 
  
  1b  What percentage of your staff was affected by the wage reduction? 
 
   1  0-2% 
   2  3-4% 
   3  5-6% 
   4  7-10% 
   5  11-20% 
   6  21-30% 
   7  31-40% 
   8  41-50% 
   9  51-70% 
    10  71-100% 
 
  
  2a    What percentage of your staff belongs to a trade union? 
 
   1  0-10% 
   2  11-20% 
   3  21-30% 
   4  31-40% 
   5  41-50% 
   6  51-60% 
   7  61-70% 
   8  71-80% 
   9  81-90% 
    10  91-100% 
 
  
  2b  What percentage of your staff is covered by some form of profit-sharing 
system, bonus system, or other system for sharing company profits? 
 
   1  0-10% 
   2  11-20% 
   3  21-30% 
   4  31-40% 
   5  41-50% 
   6  51-60% 
   7  61-70% 
   8  71-80% 
   9  81-90% 
    10  91-100% 
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  2c  What percentage of your staff is covered by some form of  
   piece-rate  system? 
 
   1  0-10% 
   2  11-20% 
   3  21-30% 
   4  31-40% 
   5  41-50% 
   6  51-60% 
   7  61-70% 
   8  71-80% 
   9  81-90% 
    10  91-100% 
 
  
  2d  What percentage of your staff has a permanent employment contract? 
 
   1  0-10% 
   2  11-20% 
   3  21-30% 
   4  31-40% 
   5  41-50% 
   6  51-60% 
   7  61-70% 
   8  71-80% 
   9  81-90% 
    10  91-100% 
 
  
  2e  For which of the questions 1b–2d did you make a rough estimate? 
     Check those questions for which you made a rough estimate 
 
   1  Question  1b 
   2  Question  2a 
   3  Question  2b 
   4  Question  2c 
   5  Question  2d 
 
  
  3a  Does it happen that your workplace is approached by job seekers who  
    offer to work under conditions that are inferior (lower pay, less convenient 
hours, poorer work environment, etc.) to those you normally offer new  
    employees with corresponding qualifications? 
 
   1  Yes,  frequently 
   2  Yes,  occasionally       
   3   Yes, but only seldom       
   4   No, never        Go to question 4a 
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  3b    Have any of these individuals been employed under such inferior  
     conditions? 
 
   1  Yes,  most  of  them   Go to question 4a 
   2   Yes, some of them   Go to question 4a 
   3   Yes, but only seldom 
   4  No,  never 
    
 
     To be answered by those persons who selected alternative 3 or 4 to  
     question  3b 
 
  3c    Why are these individuals seldom or never employed? 
      
                          No signi-   Little signi- Some signi-   Great signi-  Decisive 
                          ficance   ficance      ficance       ficance          factor 
   a The union opposes it      1    2     3        4         5  
   b Violation of firm’s personnel policy  1    2     3        4         5    
    c  No  vacancies      1    2     3        4         5     
   d Laws and collective bargaining 
     agreements  prevent  it      1    2     3        4         5    
   e Creates conflict among employees  1    2     3        4         5  
   f  Individuals who offer to work under 
       inferior conditions are less productive  1    2     3        4         5  
   g  Other  explanation  ………………………   1    2     3        4         5  
   
 
  4a    To what extent do the obligations associated with the Employment Security 
Act (LAS) induce you to make a more thorough review of job applicants’ 
qualifications than would else be the case? 
 
   1   To a very great extent 
   2   To a fairly great extent 
   3   To some extent 
   4  None  at  all 
 
 
  4b  To what extent do the obligations associated with the Employment Security 
Act make you more prone to adjust to a business upturn by requiring the 
current staff to work overtime rather than by hiring new personnel?  
 
   1   To a very great extent 
   2   To a fairly great extent 
   3   To some extent 
     4  None  at  all 
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  4c  To what extent do the obligations associated with the Employment Security 
Act induce you to offer flexible, short-term contracts in the form of trial 
employment, use of personnel from temporary hiring agencies, etc? 
 
   1   To a very great extent 
   2   To a fairly great extent 
   3   To some extent 
   4  None  at  all 
 
  
  5a  To what extent can you evaluate whether a specific employee  
  performs satisfactorily on the job? 
 
   1   To a very great extent 
   2   To a fairly great extent 
   3   To some extent 
   4  None  at  all 
 
  
  5b  To what extent can you, where appropriate, evaluate whether  
    a group of employees (e.g. a team, division, project group, etc)    
    performs satisfactorily on   the job? 
    
   1   To a very great extent 
   2   To a fairly great extent 
   3   To some extent 
   4  None  at  all 
          5  Not  applicable 
 
 
  6a   How do you think that the work effort of your employees would 
       be affected if there was less unemployment in the region? 
 
     1    Greatly deteriorate  
     2   Deteriorate  somewhat 
     3   No  change 
     4   Improve  somewhat 
     5   Greatly  improve 
 
 
  6b    How do you think that the work effort of your employees would be  
      affected if wages/salaries increased in comparable companies or  
      organizations, but stayed the same at your unit? 
  
     1   Greatly  deteriorate 
     2   Deteriorate  somewhat 
     3   No  change 
     4   Improve  somewhat 
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  6c   How do you think that the work effort of your employees would be  
      affected if unemployment benefits were increased? 
  
     1   Greatly  deteriorate 
     2   Deteriorate  somewhat 
     3   No  change 
     4   Improve  somewhat 
     5   Greatly  improve 
  
 
   According to some theories, keen competition between employees for salaries 
and career opportunities will stimulate people to work harder, which is beneficial 
to the workplace. According to other theories, keen competition between em-
ployees results in a poor climate of cooperation, which is detrimental to the 
workplace. 
 
  7    In your opinion, how does (or would) keen competition between  
      employees affect work motivation at your workplace? 
 
     1   Solely  negatively 
     2    Both negatively and positively, but mostly negatively 
     3    Neither negatively nor positively 
     4    Both negatively and positively, but mostly positively 
     5   Solely  positively 
 
 
  8       Differences in pay among employees can have different effects on work  
           motivation. In your opinion, how do (or would) large pay differentials affect   
            work motivation at your workplace? 
 
     1   Solely  negatively 
     2    Both negatively and positively, but mostly negatively 
     3    Neither negatively nor positively 
     4    Both negatively and positively, but mostly positively 
     5   Solely  positively 
 
 
  How can one promote employee motivation? Indicate to what extent  
  you apply  the following measures. 
 
  9a  To what extent do you supervise and monitor the work performance of 
your employees? 
 
     1    To a very great extent 
     2    To a fairly great extent 
     3    To some extent 
     4    To a very little extent 
     5    Not at all 
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  9b   To what extent do you establish career tracks, which give able  
     employees the opportunity to qualify for promotion? 
 
     1    To a very great extent 
     2    To a fairly great extent 
     3    To some extent 
     4    To a very little extent 
     5    Not at all 
 
  
  9c   To what extent do you pay wages/salaries that are linked to performance? 
      
     1    To a very great extent 
     2    To a fairly great extent 
     3    To some extent 
     4    To very little extent 
     5    Not at all 
 
  
  9d   To what extent do you try to promote good management-worker relation-
ships (e.g. by creating interesting work-assignments, delegating decision-
making, formulating transparent objectives for your activities, etc)? 
 
     1    To a very great extent 
     2    To a fairly great extent 
     3    To some extent 
     4    To very little extent 
     5    Not at all 
 
 
  10a  During pay negotiations, how common is it that your employees (or their 
union representatives) compare their pay with that of other employees at 
your own workplace? 
 
     1   Always 
     2   Frequently       
     3   Sometimes     
     4   Infrequently 
     5   Never 
 
 
  10b  During pay negotiations, how common is it that your employees (or their 
union   representatives) compare their pay with that of employees at other 
workplaces? 
 
     1   Always 
     2   Frequently   
     3   Sometimes     
     4   Infrequently 
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  10c  How common is it that your employees (or their union representatives) re-
quire  wage hikes because of high profits, or high ability to pay, in your 
firm/organization?  
 
     1   Always 
     2   Frequently 
     3   Sometimes     
     4   Infrequently 
     5   Never 
 
  
  11a  In your opinion, do those of your employees who are dissatisfied with their 
pay normally reduce performance? 
 
     1   Yes,  definitely  so 
     2    Yes, to a great extent 
     3    Yes, to some extent 
     4    Yes, but only occasionally 
     5    No, I do not think so  
 
  
  11b  In your opinion, do those of your employees who are dissatisfied with their 
pay normally seek employment elsewhere? 
 
     1   Yes,  definitely  so 
     2    Yes, to a great extent 
     3    Yes, to some extent 
     4    Yes, but only occasionally 
     5    No, I do not think so  
 
      
  Below we present some economic theories and a few hypothetical examples that attempt 
to shed light on why wages/salaries seldom fall in spite of high unemployment. 
  
  12a  Some researchers argue that the reason why wages seldom fall is that wage relativities 
might be altered. Employees try to protect their position in the wage hierarchy, and they re-
sist wage cuts because they are afraid that they will fall behind other employees, at their 
own or other units.  
 
     To what extent does this explanation agree with your view/experience? 
 
     1   Complete  agreement   
     2    To a great extent  
     3    To some extent  
     4    To very little extent 
     5    Does not at all agree with my experience  
 IFAU – Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside   82
 
  12b  One theory to explain why wages may end up above the level that gives full employment is 
based on the notion that hirings and firings are costly to firms. These costs (for interviews, 
advertisements, training, redundancy payment, etc.) make firms eager to keep already em-
ployed workers. By pushing up wages, this situation is exploited by employees. 
 
     To what extent does this explanation agree with your view/experience? 
 
     1   Complete  agreement   
     2    To a great extent  
     3    To some extent  
     4    To very little extent 
     5    Does not at all agree with my experience  
  
 
  13a  Assume hypothetically that your enterprise is making a small surplus. There is no inflation, 
and unemployment is high. There are many job seekers applying for a job at your unit. Un-
der these circumstances you decide to propose a pay cut of 5%.  
 
     How do you think that your employees would find this proposal? 
 
     1   Completely  unacceptable   
     2    Highly unacceptable  
     3    Hardly acceptable  
     4    Acceptable with great hesitation  
     5   Acceptable 
 
 
  13b  Assume hypothetically that your enterprise is making a small surplus. Inflation is 10% per-
cent, and unemployment is high. There are many job seekers applying for a job at your 
unit. Under these circumstances you decide to propose a pay increase of only 5%. 
 
   How do you think that your employees would find this proposal? 
 
     1   Completely  unacceptable   
     2   Highly  unacceptable 
     3    Hardly acceptable  
     4    Acceptable with great hesitation  
     5   Acceptable   
 
  
  14a  How long time must a person have been unemployed before you consider 
him/her to be less suitable for a job, in spite of the fact that the person in 
other respects appears to satisfy all requirements? 
 
  1  Has  no  significance 
  2   More than one month but less than six months 
  3   More than six months but less than one year 
  4   More than one year but less than 18 months 
  5   More than 18 months but less than two years 
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  14b  Assume that a person has alternated between unemployment and partici-
pation in a training program for some time. How long time must the person 
have been in this situation before you consider him/her to be less suitable 
for a job, in spite of the fact that the person in other  respects  appears  to 
satisfy all requirements? 
 
  1  Has  no  significance 
  2   More than one month but less than six months 
  3   More than six months but less than one year 
  4   More than one year but less than 18 months 
  5   More than 18 months but less than two years 
  6   Two years or more 
  
  
  14c Assume that a person has alternated between unemployment and relief 
work for some time. How long time must the person have been in this 
situation before you consider him/her to be less suitable for a job, in spite 
of the fact that the person in other respects appears to satisfy all require-
ments? 
 
  1  Has  no  significance 
  2   More than one month but less than six months 
  3   More than six months but less than one year 
  4   More than one year but less than 18 months 
  5   More than 18 months but less than two years 
  6   Two years or more 
 
   
     Other comments 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 




  Thank you for your participation! 
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